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The rapid expansion and integration of Distributed Generations (DG) into power 
systems plays an increasingly important role in their planning, operation, and control. 
The rules used to design and operate current systems are being altered by the DGs 
incorporation. This may jeopardize the system’s reliability and security. Private 
owners of large DGs should not be restricted to a particular time schedule to 
connect/disconnect their generation to/from the system. This feature dynamically 
changes the typical power system with unidirectional power flow from generation to 
the loads. A smart Central Protection Unit (CPU) is needed to take proper measures in 
case of DGs arbitrarily disconnection, isolation or any other type of fault. On the other 
hand, recent major blackouts resulting from pushing the power systems to the edge 
has revealed the need for a smarter supervisory system for enhanced reliability and 
stability. Hence, there is a high demand for a robust and smart supervisory system 
which can diagnose power systems’ disturbances in real-time and prevent aggravation 
and expansion.  
This thesis is focused on studying the impacts of DG integration on the power 
systems. Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) play an important role on the monitoring 
of power systems. Multiple major data analysis techniques including K-means, Smart 
K-means clustering, and DBSCAN clustering of the PMU output data have been 
implemented. Higher order moments of Kurtosis and Skewness indices were also 
employed in order to estimate the system state.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
The power system infrastructure is in an era of transition. Recent advances and 
the developments in engineering and technology have impacted the way many power 
professionals perceive a smart and reliable power grid. Carbone Nano-tubes, Nano 
science, Gallium Nitrate, low-k and high-k materials, super conductors, optical fibers, 
artificial hearts, and the progress toward space mineral extraction are all examples of 
the numerous fields in which advances have been made. However, power systems that 
is one of the most important fields, has not been improving in pace with the rest for 
one and a half centuries.  
The rapid expansion and integration of Distributed Generations (DG) into 
power systems plays an increasingly important role in their planning, operation, and 
control. The rules used to design and operate current systems are being altered by the 
DGs incorporation. This may jeopardize the system’s reliability and security [1]. 
Private owners of large DGs should not be restricted to a particular time schedule to 
connect/disconnect their generation to/from the system. This feature dynamically 
changes the typical power system with unidirectional power flow from generation to 
the loads. A smart Central Protection Unit (CPU) is needed to take proper measures in 
case of DGs arbitrarily disconnection, isolation or any other type of fault. On the other 
hand, recent major blackouts resulting from pushing the power systems to the edge 
has revealed the need for a smarter supervisory system for enhanced reliability and 
stability. Hence, there is a high demand for a robust and smart supervisory system 
which can diagnose power systems’ disturbances in real-time and prevent aggravation 
and expansion.  
Many issues with the integrated power systems since the 1970s have 
convinced governments and researchers to move toward Sustainable Energy 
Resources (SER).  These have been known as the best solutions for issues such as 
high carbon dioxide emissions, ozone layer and environmental concerns, relieving oil-
dependent economies, and more importantly, attracting small investors. Utilizing SER 
generation units enables the industry to manufacture and scatter small generation units 
all over the power system network, known as Distributed Generation (DG). These 
units facilitate the use of renewable energies with small capital expenses which makes 
2 
it more affordable for private owners. Imagine that every house would have one or 
two types of DGs like PHEV, Wind Turbine, Photo Voltaic (PV), Fuel Cell (FC), 
Geothermal unit, diesel or a gas generator, depending on their geographical location 
[1,2]. This leads us to the point of controlling and supervising the power system rather 
than generating and transferring the electricity. This is a complicated system 
containing various DGs with private owners, which may or may not be connected to 
the network. Therefore it demands an adaptive and intelligent power network for its 
complexity and dynamic behavior. It is useful to mention that current networks are 
designed and operated with a specific and fixed structure. Any major change requires 
a physical action such as sending crew to the site. 
Recent wide area power outages mainly resulted from failures in responding to 
and extinguishing aggravating disturbances in power systems. This clearly shows the 
demand for drastic reforms and basic changes in power system control and 
supervision means, methods, and algorithms. On the other hand, integrating various 
DGs into the power system makes this task more complex by converting the current 
stationary power systems which have already been pushed to their stability limits into 
a dynamic power system. The University of Texas at Tyler research group has 
designed a control and supervisory algorithm for such a dynamic power system 
named Central Protection Unit (CPU). CPU is a state of the art intelligent power 
system management and control center scheme which enables us to move toward the 
unavoidable smart power systems. They take advantage of the latest science, 
technology, and engineering advances such as super processors, fast, wireless and 
optic communications, PMU, GPS, SCADA, WAMS, and digital relays [2]. Also, 
mathematical approaches like Neural Networks, Clustering and Graph Theory have 
been utilized. The main responsibility of the CPU is to detect the disturbances and 
system alterations, and subsequently respond with the best possible actions.  
1.2 Thesis Objective 
This thesis is focused on studying the impacts of DG integration on the power 
systems. Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) play an important role on the monitoring 
of power systems. Multiple major data analysis techniques including K-means, Smart 
K-means clustering, and DBSCAN clustering of the PMU output data have been 
implemented. Higher order moments of Kurtosis and Skewness indices were also 
employed in order to estimate the system state. 
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The objective of this research work is to establish an adaptive and intelligent 
Central Protection Unit (CPU) for evolving power systems. The CPU aims to be 
adaptive enough to employ various DGs into the power systems and prevent 
scarifying the system security and reliability due to integration impacts. This should 
be done by remotely manipulating protection system devices such relay characteristics 
to meet the new situation. Fault and disturbance diagnosis, utilizing PMU technology, 
and effective islanding are also included in the CPU algorithm and objectives. 
Various objectives have been considered in order to pave the way toward reaching a 
robust, smart, and adaptive CPU. The following is a list of the issues addressed in this 
thesis: 
 Evaluating issues about DG integration in power systems  
 Narrowly categorizing DG’s integration impacts on Distribution Networks. 
 PMU’s principal mathematic and algorithms accuracy and robustness 
 Employing SCADA and WAMS in new proposed CPU. 
 Methods for analyzing PMU, SCADA, WAMS and other necessary data 
acquisition systems 
 Neural networks, pattern recognition, and K-means clustering. 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
Chapter 2 discusses the power system structures, especially in distribution 
systems, the different DG types, and their various power electronics interconnection. 
Chapter 3 presents the result yielded by comprehensive simulation for categorizing 
DGs’ integration impacts, especially on distribution networks and how their 
interconnection may influence these impacts. Chapter 4 introduces and compares 
various PMUs’ algorithms and chooses one as the most suitable and applicable for 
CPU y providing its mathematical principal along with its simulation results. 
Additionally, three mathematical methods for analyzing PMUs data have been 
thoroughly covered. Chapter 5 covers the CPU logic flowcharts and algorithms in 
employing the discussed methods to intelligently decide about and react to changes in 
the system or disturbances. The thesis closes with a concise conclusion along with 
proposed future work. 
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Chapter Two 
Power Systems and Distributed Generation 
2.1 Overview 
Distributed generation integration is the main point of this thesis. It proposes 
changes in the principal rules and regulations in which power systems structures 
currently operate. These changes include changing the power flow direction, current 
direction, and even the system admittance matrix. Therefore, to build a robust 
protection system, one should first have a broad knowledge about the network 
structure and the DGs which are supposed to be integrated. This chapter presents the 
various power system structures, the different DGs specifications, and their specific 
characteristics. 
2.2 Power System Structures 
2.2.1Loop Networks 
One of the power systems distribution topology is the loop structure. This 
structure is a complex topology in terms of design, control, and expansion. This is 
why protection and compensation equipment for such networks are usually more 
complicated to design. It takes more time to fulfill the design process which includes 
the complicated load grow forecast and relative power flow in loop networks 
comparing to radial. In distribution power systems, the loop structure is referring to a 
system in which a closed loop path starting from a generation unit can be found.  
 
Figure 2.1 Power System Distribution Networks Loop Topology 
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Figure 2.1 shows a typical loop structure in the power system distribution feeder. 
One of the loop structure’s advantages is the better voltage profile in comparison to 
that of the radial networks’. The loop structure in Figure 2.1 is feeding from a single 
point to the utility grid (point S) but a loop structure has the capability to inject power 
from different loop sides. This reduces the transmission path from the generation to 
the consumption point, resulting in less power loss and subsequently better and more 
even voltage profile. Also, designing an overcurrent protection scheme is complicated 
in these networks and possible just by using directional overcurrent relay (R67).  
Designing overcurrent protection requires calculating changes in load and generation 
in order to reach accurate values for current flowing in both directions and at different 
times. Adding DGs to such a topology increases the complexity, particularly if the 
DGs are decisive unit with a private owner who arbitrarily determines the time 
schedule for being coupled with the network. 
2.2.2 Radial Networks 
One of the famous topologies which power systems fell into is radial networks. 
Radial networks are well known in power systems because of their long time and 
wide area applications. They have been used in power systems since the very 
beginning because of their ease of design and simplicity in their compensations. 
Radial feeders are networks in which there is a single path from the generation point 
to the loads. Figure 2.2 shows a typical radial distribution feeder. Due to the long 
transmission distance from the generation units to load points, this type of network 
experiences a poor voltage profile. That is why reactive compensations, such 
capacitances and synchronous condensers, have been widely used to meet the voltage 
standards. 
 
Figure 2.2 Power System Distribution Networks Radial Topology 
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As it was before, in radial distribution networks there is a single path from the 
generation units to the down feeders. This is due to the down-stream feeders’ passive 
load which always consumes power. This means that radial networks have an 
important principal rule called unidirectional power flow which is the same during 
both normal and faulty working conditions. This rule makes it easy to calculate the 
fault current level and design an over current protection system using over current 
relays (R50/51). However, one of the challenges of integrating DGs into these 
networks is that the unidirectional path for power may change either in steady state or 
during fault. Integrating DGs changes the passive nature down-stream feeders to an 
active feeder. After integration, the feeder and its load may need less power or no 
power and even may inject power into the system. This is a significant change that 
influences all of the protection system devices and makes their design inapplicable. 
DGs’ integration in radial networks has many impacts; these have been covered in 
Chapter 3 of this document. 
2.3 Power System Protection 
Protection system in a power network consists of equipment ensuring the 
electrical flow reliability and security, and also maintaining the safety of humans and 
devices. One of the special protection schemes which has been widely used, 
particularly in distribution networks, is over current protection. Over current 
protection systems sense the current in various specified grids to avoid exceeding the 
maximum allowed rate. This goal has been fulfilled mostly by utilizing instantaneous 
and overcurrent relays (R50/51) and directional overcurrent relays (R67). Relays 
follow their central logic when tracking the current, sensed by current transformers, in 
order to determine the proper time for tripping the circuit breaker after fault diagnosis. 
Many standards, such as IEC 60255 regulate the best function for OCR (Over Current 
Relays) relays for trip time determinations.  
This thesis has a special focus on over current protection as a widely used 
protection system in high voltage distribution networks. MATLAB has been used for 
simulating the test cases and benchmarks but it does not include protection devices 
such as the R50/51 and R61. These are necessary components for an overcurrent 
protection system design. The design of overcurrent protection has been thoroughly 
explained in the next section along with design instances for IEEE test cases in order 
to evaluate DGs integration’s multiple impacts. One of the biggest issues in DGs 
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integration is not losing the system reliability and security. That is, protection system 
performance should be maintained either by improving and updating it or by applying 
fundamental reforms. 
2.3.1 Over Current Relay R 50/51 and R67 
Over Current Relay (OCR) is the most affordable, applicable, and traditional 
protective element which has been used in radial feeders, particularly in high voltage 
distribution networks. A typical distribution feeder consists of sets of coordinated over 
current relays cooperating with automated switches, circuit breakers and possibly 
recolsers and fuses, depending on voltage level. However, integrating DGs with these 
networks would affect the protection scheme performance in different aspects. These 
can be malfunctioning, bad coordination, or even redundancy. As mentioned before, 
MATLAB does not include protective relays elements. Therefore, in this section the 
simulated relays 50/51 and their details are presented. 
The over current relays are categorized depending on their characteristics into three 
groups: 1. Definite Current or Instantaneous 2. Definite Time (DT) and 3. Inverse 
Definite Minimum Time (IDMT). The Overcurrent protection scheme design starts 
from end downstream feeder to maintain selectivity and also minimum coordination 
between relays. Using definite time OCRs result in an accumulative large trip time in 
upstream feeders. However, this is contradictory to those feeders facing a higher fault 
current, making definite time relays obsolete. Current industrial digital relays such as 
the SEL-551 are implementing complicated characteristics besides their extra 
embedded functionalities. IDMT over current relay characteristics fall into some 
standard styles. IEC 60255 and IEEE define standard curves for IDMT overcurrent 
relays based on α and β coefficients. General equation describing these curves can be 
expressed as [2]: 
T(Ish) = TSM × ((
β
PSMα−1
) + M)                (2-1) 
While α, β and M are the relay curve deterministic coefficients, PSM (Plug Setting 
Multiplier) is the ratio of fault current to pick-up current (
𝐼𝑓
𝐼𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑢𝑝
), which is the 
maximum tolerable current inside the equipment’s thermal and electrical limits. TSM 
(Time Setting Multiplier) is a discrete multiplier which, in recent numerical relays, can 
be in 0.05 or 0.1 intervals.  
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Figure 2.3 OCR 51 Details MATLAB Signal 
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α  and β  should be equal to 0.02 and 0.14, respectively, in order to represent 
standard inverse OCRs (R51). The OCR 51 with the normal inverse characteristic has 
been simulated in MATLAB. Figure 2.3 shows the designed relay response signals for 
a test fault with its calculated RMS current that is depicted in Figure 2.3a. Figure 2.3b 
illustrates the relay’s core function raw output regarding the measured rms current for 
the test fault that happened at t=0.1 sec. The relay algorithm for fault detection and 
Trip Time (TT) calculation consists of five logical steps that are shown in Figure 2.3c. 
The relay’s first logical phase shows a clear time when no faults are detected. On the 
other hand, phase II is related to the fault time transient cycles which can last from 3 to 
8 cycles [3]. Output TT should not be calculated based on a fault transient, however it 
is not recommended to simply ignore transient current since exceeding transients can 
be very destructive for some equipment. The relay TT is determined based on the 
transients’ maximum. This is being held for 5 cycles to ensure damping transients. 
After these 5 cycles’ minimum time policy, the relay goes into III which is steady state 
fault current determination. Then the relay is constantly looking for new faults to 
reduce the determined TT time which is in phase IV. In the last phase, the circuit 
breaker is commanded to trip and shows that this relay has already reached the 
promised time. Then the relay stops its processes and just shows the exact time in 
which the trip command occurred [3].   
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Figure 2.4 DOCR 67 Details MATLAB Signal 
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The same design scheme has been followed in this part to achieve a Directional 
Overcurrent Relay (R67), but for enhancing the relay capabilities PMU sequence 
signals have been considered in fault type detection. Results in Figures 2.4 and 2.5 are 
illustrating the final signal outputs from the designed relay block in MATLAB 
Simulink. A positive signal sign represent a forward fault and a negative sign is realted 
to a reverse fault. Then the amount of signal stands for the type of fault as have shown 
in figures. Both R50/51 and R67 have been simulated in MATLAB Simulink using the 
embedded coding which runs in each Simulink time step iterations. It should be 
mentioned that fault type capability has been obtained by using the designed PMU 
(will be discussed in chapter 4) output sequences’ signals.  
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Figure 2.5 DOCR 67 Details MATLAB Signal 
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2.4 Distributed Generation (DG)  
Distributed Generation (DG) is referring to the relatively small and distributed 
power generation units which mostly take advantage of renewable energies. Different 
standards and various literatures have proposed controversial and not unified 
definition for this term. It can be loosely defined as small-scale generator working as 
a local generation plant for assisting Utility Grids (UG). In addition to generating the 
electricity and assisting the UG, DGs have more advantages for power systems. 
Integrating the DGs raises many issues and challenges which, despite their benefits, 
might threaten the system’s security and reliability. That is why world power system 
leaders decided to go through fundamental changes and improvements in power 
systems to be able to adaptively accept the DGs with minimum risk. A recently 
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developed term, Sustainable Energy Resources (SER), also refers to DGs with more 
emphasis on their renewable energy origination. 
DGs integration in power systems is accompanied with many advantages and 
disadvantages. One of the primary advantages of DGs integration is reducing the path 
for transmitting the electricity. This reduction results in reducing power loss, 
improving the voltage profile, decreasing the need for reactive compensation, and also 
reducing the need for transmission line. On the other hand, some environmental issues 
also will be resolved by using DGs, which work by renewable resources. The 
following is a list of some of these advantages: 
 Stop transferring electricity 
 Transmission Line Losses 
 Right of Way 
 Congestion  
 Quit using Fossil Based Fuels  
 Dependence on Oil 
 Global Warming  
 Carbon Dioxide 
 Reduce plants capital investment 
 Private and Public Investment 
 Utility-Costumer Partnership 
 Improving Power Market 
DG units take advantage of many energy resources to produce electric energy. 
This is one of the ways to categorize the DGs based on their natural energy resource. 
This can be a Fuel Cell, Photo Voltaic, Wind Turbine, Synchronous generator and so 
on. 
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Different DGs with various natural energy resources possess special 
characteristics and may demand different interconnection devices. As a consequence, 
these differences will lead into different models for different DGs. Four types of DGs 
have been used in this research work to model and integrate into the benchmarks for 
constructing interested test cases and scenarios. Wind Turbine, Fuel Cell, Photo 
Voltaic and synchronous generator are currently some of the most popular and 
available DGs. Therefore, these four DGs have been chosen to be modeled and 
integrated into the IEEE test cases for studying protection issues.  
2.4.1 Wind Turbines 
Wind turbines compose a large share of current DG technology. This is due to its 
clean energy generation. The first generation of industrial wind turbines synchronous 
generators has been heavily used. This relatively old type of wind turbines called 
fixed speed wind turbine utilizes gear boxes to be able to operate in synchronous 
speed. The gear box increases the wind speed range that the turbine can operate 
within only trivially, but brings maintenance expenses and risks. However induction 
generators have fixed this issue. The most famous wind turbines taking advantage of 
induction generators are called Doubly-Fed Induction Generation (DFIG). Figure 2.6 
illustrates a schematic of DFIG and its interconnection. DFIG state space equations 
are shown in equations 2.2-2.4 [4, 5]: 
 
[
uds
uqs
udr
uqr
] =
[
 
 
 
−Rs − Lsp Ls
−ωeLs −Rs − Lsp
Lmp −ωeLm
ωeLm Lmp
−Lmp (ωe − ωg)Lm
−(ωe − ωg)Lm −Lmp
Rr + Lrp −(ωe − ωg)Lr
(ωe − ωg)Lr Rr + Lrp ]
 
 
 
[
 
 
 
ids
iqs
idr
iqr]
 
 
 
          (2.2) 
Te = Lm(iqsidr − idsiqr)                 (2.3) 
S = ωe − ωg                              (2.4) 
 
Figure 2.6 DFIG Wind Turbine 
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The use of induction generation in DFIG allows them to work with a large range 
of wind speeds. A back-to-back voltage controlled power electronic interface feeds 
the DFIG wound rotor in order to control the excitation current magnitude and 
frequency. This interface, which has a significant role in DFIG operation, consists of 
an AC to DC rectifier in the grid side which is also called grid side converter, and a 
DC to AC inverter, which is also called rotor side converter. These two power 
electronic converters use control algorithms to evaluate the d-q axis required in the 
induction motor wound rotor to reach the pre-defined frequency and voltage output. 
Using this technique and by manipulating the rotor current and frequency the 
induction generation can operate within a wide range of wind speed (5 to 25 m/s). On 
the other hand, these back-to-back converters are able to regulate the output power. 
This is how the DFIG can produce desired output feedbacks such as output active 
power, reactive power, calculating the variations and current d-q axis. Therefore 
DFIG and some other DGs which will be connected to the network using such a 
power electronic interface have the ability to regulate their reactive output power as 
long as it is within its nominal rating. Besides assisting UG in reactive power 
production, DGs are also able to produce reactive power and relieve the distribution 
networks from reactive compensations and capacitors. However, these interfaces have 
their own impacts and limitations. IEEE 1547 regulates all types of DG 
interconnections in regards to meeting various standards including power quality, 
harmonics, power protection and fault condition response. Power electronic interfaces 
can inject a significant amount of harmonics into the system. 
2.4.2 Fuel Cell (FC) 
 
Figure 2.7 FC Electrical Equivalent 
 
Figure 2.8 FC Characteristic Curve 
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Fuel Cells are one the most innovative recently well-developed DG types. In this 
thesis, the Proton Exchange Membrane Fuel Cell (PEMFC) MATLAB modules have 
been used along with a boost converter and an IGBT inverter with suitable output 
filters and transformers. Figures 2.7 and 2.8 depict a FC electrical model and 
characteristics curve. The FC is a DC power generator; therefore, it needs a power 
inverter. This is the reason that FC is also categorized as power electronic interfaced 
DG.  In the following subsection a discussion regarding the different types of FCs will 
be made. 
2.4.3 Photo Voltaic (PV) 
Photo Voltaic (PV) DG modeled using MATLAB based on the Figures 2.10 and 
2.11 depicts that PV electrical equivalent circuit and PV characteristics curve. Figure 
2.12 shows the MATLAB block diagram modeled for PV. The SunPower SPR-305-
WHT PV cell with 5 series cells and using 350 parallel strings has been used to reach 
preferred voltage. Since PV, like FC, is a DC generation unit, a DG a boost converter 
has been used to provide the inverter with a constant DC link. A voltage controlled 
inverter has been used to invert the DC current to AC with defined frequency.  
 
Figure 2.9 FC MATLAB Model 
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2.4.4 Synchronous Generator 
Synchronous generators with small and medium ratings are also being used for 
DGs. Some turbines such as the Aeroderivative gas turbines and many other types of 
synchronous generators are currently working in industries, harbors, and hospitals as 
back up or emergency units that can be employed as DGs once the infrastructure is 
ready to integrate them. However, the reason that we are using a synchronous 
generator is so that it can serve as an example of DGs that do not need any 
interconnection to be coupled with power systems. Synchronous DGs take advantage 
of AVR and Governor to control their output voltage and active power as well as 
frequency and reactive power. This makes a significant difference in these types of 
DGs’ response during power system disturbances, particularly during severe faults. 
This will be explained in more detail in the next section. 
Figure 2.11 PV Characteristic Curve Figure 2.10 PV Electrical Equivalent 
Figure 2.12 PV MATLAB Model 
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2.5 DGs Interconnections 
Different DGs use different interconnections to be coupled to power systems, as 
has been briefly discussed in previous section. DGs fall into two groups based on their 
interconnections: 
 Directly Interfaced Distribution Generators (DIDG)
 Inverter Interfaced Distributed Generators (IIDG)
DGs’ interconnection plays a critical role in investigating system protection issues 
after their integration. The first group, DIDG, is connected to the network directly. 
DGs such as fixed speed wind turbines, micro turbines, small synchronous turbines 
and Aeroderivative gas turbines are examples of systems which fall within this 
category. DIDG DGs have their own systems to be regulated in case of output voltage 
and frequency as their first priority and also to produce the desired active and reactive 
power. That is, DIDG do not use any power electronic based interconnection since 
their produced electricity is not DC originated. Therefore in case of fault or 
disturbances, DIDGs’ responses are more similar to ordinary power generation units, 
but in smaller scales. A gas or steam power generation unit or any other rotatory 
machine has a fault current between 5 to 13 times their nominal current. This 
originates from the electromagnetic field stored in the rotatory machine iron which 
can be released quickly to produce excessive current. Also, the machine torque has 
the ability to support it in case of fault. The IIDG group refers to the DGs which need 
some power electronic devices to connect to the power systems. DGs whose power 
originated from a DC source are good examples of this. Recently developed DGs 
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which take advantage of various renewable and sustainable energy resources do not 
necessarily meet the requirements and regulations. For this reason, they need power 
electronic interconnections to regulate their DC produced power in desired AC with 
proper voltage and frequency. Figure 2.13 shows some of the most typical structures 
for such interconnections. There are many schemes that are applicable for connecting 
DGs to the network. Figure 2.13.b depicts the most typical and industrial version for 
DC based sources. In this interconnection, the source produced DC current will 
change into a preferable voltage level by a boost converter. The boost converter 
increases the voltage level of the small voltage generated, maintaining a theoretically 
and mostly stable constant DC link for the inverter by using a capacitance in its link to 
an inverter. At last the inverter produces the AC power using the constant provided 
DC even during a fault or any other transients. The inverter output will be 
smoothened by an output filter for harmonic reduction. One the advantages of using 
this inverter interface is that we can demand a DG unit to produce reactive power 
using its power electronic switches just as a FACTS device. However, a power 
electronic interface has its own limits and boundaries such maximum current. 
Typically, manufacturers utilize their own protection scheme to protect the inverter 
section and its switches against over current, over voltage, and spikes. Therefore, an 
IIDG generation unit does not contribute to fault current compared to the DIDG DG. 
Manufacturers’ protection schemes normally limit the inverter current by setting their 
control and protection setting to 100%-400% of their nominal current. Therefore, 
during fault an IIDG unit does not contribute to the fault current as it was expected. 
This is an important piece of information which should be considered both in 
integrating DGs and also regulating the networks’ protection for DGs’ employment. 
For instance, a DFIG generation unit, even though it is a rotatory generation unit, does 
not contribute in a fault like a synchronous generator. DFIG, PV, and FC control 
setting in their power electronic devices limits the current from exceeding the 
switches maximum allowed rate. Although some prototypes may have a transient 
significant current between 4 to 6 times of their fault steady state current, this 
transient will be mitigated in less than 3 cycles, usually in the first cycle.  
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Figures 2.14 to 2.16 illustrate the discussed issue for DGs that has been simulated 
in this work. All DGs have been exposed to a faulty scenario when each fault stays for 
0.2 seconds and a 0.2 seconds intermittent have been given between faults so DGs are 
able to restore. The first fault is a balanced bolted 3-ph fault and after 0.4 seconds the 
system will experience a LLG fault. At the end a LG fault will be also tested on the 
system to investigate all fault types for comparing their resulted currents. Figure 2.14 
depicts the synchronous generator fault response. From this figure it can be seen that 
the synchronous DGs will highly contribute to the fault current as it has been 
discussed before. This contribution can be between 5 to 13 fold of their rating current 
and will be ended only by protective relays such as OCR 50/51.  
    
 
Figure 2.14 Synchronous Generator Responses to Various Fault Scenarios 
  
Figure 2.16 FC Responses to Various Fault Scenarios 
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Chapter Three 
DGs Integration Impacts 
3.1 Overview 
Installing Distributed Generators (DG) in distribution networks brings many 
advantages such as improving voltage, power quality, mitigating voltage sags, 
improving transmission system congestion, and providing more affordable capacity 
for utilizing renewable energy resources. All of these factors lead utility companies to 
integrate DGs into current distribution networks as much as possible. This integration 
benefits both the customer and utility sides. However, this incorporation will change 
the radial distribution networks’ fundamental aspects: upstream or Utility Grid (UG) 
feeding, passive feeders and fault current path. The network protection system has 
been designed based on old traditional fundamentals and unable to adapt with new 
changes. Over current protection, switchgears, and circuit breakers all have been 
designed, chosen, and set based on passive down-stream feeders with constant 
amounts of current for different scenarios.  
Therefore, suitable measures should be taken before this integration to avoid the 
loss of system reliability and security. This section investigates the consequences of 
DG integration into the current distribution networks, such as bus voltage profile, 
fault current level, and contribution. The DGs’ integration impacts have been 
categorized in this study after their evaluation based on system operation. Two IEEE 
recommendations have been chosen as test cases for studying DG integration. IEEE 
13-bus HV industrial distribution network and IEEE 34-Bus unbalanced network have 
been simulated in details using MATLAB SimPowerSys. Four different types of DGs 
have been employed in three scenarios with different penetration levels. Different DG 
types enable us to investigate the DG interconnection impacts on fault current 
characteristics and sharing. Besides the simple integration, we would be able to 
evaluate the DGs penetration impacts on discovered issues. On the other hand, as it 
has been discussed, one DIDG and three IIDG have been chosen in order to evaluate 
and prove the impacts of the DGs’ interconnection 
. 
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Figure 3.1 IEEE 13-Bus Radial Distribution System 
3.2 Impacts on Power System 
3.2.1 Structure Alteration 
According to the recent research and studies, distributed generation is universally 
accepted as an effective and economic solution to answer the ever increasing power 
system demands [5]. It’s been decided by the United States’ Department of Energy 
(DOE) and Distributed Energy office (DE) that 22% of new installed generation 
capacity should be from DGs by the year 2012. This is why DG is considered a major 
option to ease most of the current network problems such as power loss, power 
consumption demand, voltage quality, line congestion, security, and reliability. Also, 
this approach leads toward reaching the goal of easily utilizing green and renewable 
energy resources in case of global carbon-dioxide production reduction.  
Current Distribution Networks are generally designed in a simple radial scheme, 
that is traditionally fed from upstream Utility Grid (UG) sides through LV and passive 
downstream feeders [5, 6]. Thus, in radial networks we have a unidirectional power 
flow and a same-directed current from UG towards downstream feeders, which makes 
it easy to calculate the fault current level completely provided by the UG connection. 
Therefore, design a protection scheme is easier in radial network comparing too loop 
networks [7]. On the other hand, buses voltage level decreases by getting farther from 
the UG connection. That is why radial networks have a poor voltage profile which 
should be corrected by capacitance, synchronous compensators, or FACTS devices at 
weak points. Adding DGs in such networks improves the voltage profile, but it 
changes the system’s fundamental characteristics and network impedance. Power 
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Table 3.1 Bus P-Q Values for IEEE 13-Bus 
Bus Number 
Active 
Power[KW] 
Reactive 
Power[KVar] 
4 600 530 
5 2240 2000 
9 2800 2500 
10 370 330 
11 810 800 
12 1310 1130 
13 1150 290 
system admittance, as a critical characteristic of the system, determines many system 
traits. Many system designs have been processed based on this important matrix. 
Integrating DGs into the network adds parallel impedances with power system 
matrices per each DG installed on each bus. However, figuring the IIDG equivalent 
impedance is so controversial that there is a lot of literature which proposes various 
schemes for it. By considering it, one can supervise and predict the consequences of 
such a critical change in a network’s fundamental factor. 
   Besides all of the advantages DG provides for power systems, there are some 
complexities which it brings for networks, especially those planned with old and 
traditional topologies. Hence, different types of DG integration effects should be 
investigated in order to avoid losing network security and reliability. Suitable 
measures should be taken to adapt the network by regulating devices and proposing 
new algorithms and considering currently installed elements. 
3.2.2 Voltage Profile 
In this section an IEEE 13-Bus industrial radial distribution network is used to carry 
out simulation results using MATLAB/Simulink in order to investigate DG integration 
impacts. The system was extracted from a common medium-sized industrial plant 
which has been used for many examples and calculations in IEEE Color Books series 
[7, 8]. The system feeds from a 69 KV utility grid that is assumed to have a strong bus 
connection. Bus load values can be found in table 3.1. Figure 3.1 shows 13-Bus system 
integrated with one DIDG (synchronous) and three IIDGs (FC, PV and DFIG). DG 
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Table 3.2 Case Studies 
DG Penetration 
in Case # 
Active Power Production [MW] 
Utility 
Grid 
DGs sum 
DG 
share 
DG# & 
Type 
Case1 (base 
case) 
9.2 0 N/A N/A 
Case 2 (40%) 5.7 3.5 
2 1-Syn 
0.5 2-DFIG 
0.5 3-PV 
0.5 4-FC 
Case 3 (90%) 0.7 9 
4 1-Syn 
2 2-DFIG 
2 3-PV 
1 4-FC 
buses are allocated using 2/3 rule in order to obtain a fair power loss and voltage 
impact [9]. Besides the original system, two case studies with different DG 
penetrations are simulated in normal and varied faulty condition to acquire a clear 
result how DG affects the system. DG power capacity details can be found in table 1 
along with case study details.  
The nature of radial distribution networks is to feed downstream feeders from a 
single UG connection. Transferring power through long lines, passing of different 
transformers, loads, and the other power electrical elements cause significant voltage 
reduction due to series components impedances. In traditional networks, voltage 
profile is usually improved by adding capacitors, synchronous compensators, or 
FACTS devices. Scattering distributed generators in such networks reduces the amount 
of transferred power, while suitable allocation and penetration must be considered [9]. 
Subsequently, reducing system power loss leads to obtaining better voltage supply, 
particularly regarding downstream feeders’ endpoints during full load time. These 
consequences would be more important and critical in fault conditions.  
Distribution transmission lines usually feed uniform loads. Hence transferred power 
in a distribution line point k can be expressed as a function of its length and distance 
from generation point. If 0 denotes the UG connection point and l is the line’s last 
point of load feeding, the transferred power can be expressed as bellow: 
{
𝑃0−𝑑 =
𝑑
𝑙
𝑃𝑙  , 𝑃𝑑−𝑙 = (1 −
𝑑
𝑙
) 𝑃𝑙
𝑄0−𝑑 =
𝑑
𝑙
𝑄𝑙 , 𝑄𝑑−𝑙 = (1 −
𝑑
𝑙
)𝑄𝑙
  (3.1) 
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Voltage of any point of the transmission line as well as buses can be calculated 
based on the DG position within the line (denoted as k). If the initial point of the line 
would have u0 voltage, then: 
𝑢0 = 𝑢0 − ∆𝑈 = 𝑢0 − ∆𝑈1 − ∆𝑈2   (3.2) 
As ∆𝑈 is the voltage drop, ∆𝑈1 caused from the initial point to the point of DG 
installation and ∆𝑈2happens from the DG installation point (k) to the end of the line. 
Two cases are as follow: 
Case 1: 0 < 𝑑 ≤ 𝑘 (point d before DG) 
∆𝑈1 = 𝑑
𝑟𝑃𝑑−𝑙+𝑥𝑄𝑑−𝑙
𝑢𝑁
  (3.3) 
∆𝑈2 =
𝑑
2
𝑟𝑃0−𝑑+𝑥𝑄0−𝑑
𝑢𝑁
  (3.4) 
𝑢𝑑 = 𝑢0 −
𝑑
𝑢𝑁
[(1 −
𝑑
2𝑙
) (𝑟𝑃𝑙 + 𝑥𝑄𝑙) − (𝑟𝑃𝐷𝐺 + 𝑥𝑄𝐷𝐺)]   (3.5) 
Case 2: 𝑘 < 𝑑 ≤ 𝑙 (point d after DG) 
With the same method in case one, point d voltage will be: 
𝑢𝑑 = 𝑢0 −
𝑑
𝑢𝑁
(1 −
𝑑
2𝑙
) (𝑟𝑃𝑙 + 𝑥𝑄𝑙) + (
𝑟𝑘𝑃𝐷𝐺+𝑥𝑘𝑄𝐷𝐺
𝑢𝑁
)   (3.6) 
The formulas above refer to the fact that DGs integration improves network voltage 
profile proportional to their active and reactive capacity. Figure 3.2 depicts a typical 
radial distribution feeder poor voltage profile which is a characteristic for those types 
Figure 3.2 A Typical Radial Distribution Feeder Voltage Profile 
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of network structures. Power system engineers used to improve these declining profiles 
by installing capacitive compensations or other expensive and more complicated 
compensators based on the network voltage level and priority. DGs resulting 
compensation causes voltage recover in bus 8 as it has been shown in the plot below. 
Figure 3.3 illustrates system voltage profiles of three case studies.  It is clear from the 
base case graph that using a transformer taps the minimum voltage decreased to less 
than 0.97 per unit. Meanwhile, in case 2 with DGs integration, voltages improved at 
least 1% at any buses. In case 3 we have a desired voltage magnitude in most buses 
while there are 3 buses with roughly 1% excessive voltage that originates from 
constant transformer taps in different cases. This can be easily fixed in a practical 
industrial network. It should be mentioned that transformers tap have been extracted 
from recommended IEEE 13-Bus test case and remains constant after adding DGs to 
the network. Hence DGs incorporation impacts over the test case can be watched in the 
situation where no precautionary step has been taken. Mechanical and automatic Tap 
Changer Transformers are one of the conventional ways that utility companies use 
along with capacitive compensation to avoid voltage dropping less than allowed rates. 
However it is beyond a doubt that these types of compensations have many 
disadvantages. 
Different faults have been used at different buses in order to investigate system 
voltage profiles and stability during fault condition. Some DGs have a protection 
scheme to shut down the unit or enter island mode, but voltage stability during fault is 
a vital concern for any network during any period, i.e. load voltages, neighbor regions’ 
voltage stability, relays and protection device accuracy. It has been proven that power 
Figure 3.3 IEEE 13-Bus Voltage Profile 
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systems which are able to maintain a higher voltage level during sever faults are less 
likely to experience a relay, breaker, or switchgear malfunction. On the other hand, by 
maintaining voltage within the fault current during fault, it is easier for digital relays to 
detect the instrumentation (current/voltage) transformers saturations. Figure 3.4 
illustrates system voltage profiles after fault current threshold damping for a bolted 3-
ph fault occurred at bus 11 in IEEE 13-Bus test case simulated using MATLAB’s 
power system toolbox. It is clear from plot magnifier that DG integration adds 
approximately 2 % improvement at all severely-affected bus. For instance, we have 
0.844 p.u voltage at bus 10 (PQ) which was increased to 0.879 p.u; nearly a 4 % 
improvement in case 3. As it has been shown, the black curve refers to the base case 
(case 1) which is the system without any integrated DGs and the dotted blue and red 
curves are related to case 2 and 3 with 40% and 90% DGs penetrations respectively.  
3.2.3 Fault Current Level 
Fault situation is an important issue in DGs integration. It is clear from the previous 
section that DG integration improves voltage profile. However, as mentioned before, 
adding DGs into power networks alters the system impedance matrix, i.e. bus 
Thevenin impedance reduction [9]. Those two major impacts yield a fault current 
increase in the power network which drastically influences system security and 
reliability due to loss protection devices accuracy or response. Although there are 
discriminations between IIDG and DIDG generations but even IIDG limited fault 
current along with UG and rest of DIDGs’ share impresses protection system. Figure 
3.5 shows a simple radial power network during 3 phase bolted fault with a DG 
integrated in the system. In figure 3.6, a and b show the equivalent circuits for the 
Figure 3.4 System Voltage Profile with Fault at Bus 11 
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Table 3.3 Fault Current in Blackout for Various Faults 
Fault Type Case # 
Faulty Bus 
B5 B6 B7 B11 B12 
3 Phase-
Ground 
Base Case 17.83 17.48 17.28 2.28 2.54 
Case 2 19.70 18.88 18.70 2.33 2.60 
Case 3 21.22 20.84 20.57 2.37 2.65 
Line-Line 
Base Case 15.47 15.1 14.98 1.98 2.19 
Case 2 16.86 16.44 16.29 2.01 2.25 
Case 3 18.12 17.32 17.24 2.06 2.30 
Line-Ground 
Base Case 12.24 11.97 11.09 1.45 1.58 
Case 2 13.05 12.49 12.18 1.46 1.59 
Case 3 14.31 13.36 13.01 1.46 1.60 
radial networks DG added in Figure 3.5. Defining mesh currents I1 and I2 from 5.a and 
applying the Kirchhoff law results in the equation below, yielding currents: 
[
Us
Ug
] = [
Zs + ZL (1 − l). ZL
(1 − l). ZL Zg + (1 − l). ZL
] [
I1
I2
]   (3.7) 
Zth =
(Zs+l.ZL).Zg
(Zs+l.ZL)+Zg
+ (1 − l). ZL   (3.8) 
As l =
p
d
, when p is a transmission line impedance from UG to point of DG 
installation and d is the all line impedance (UG to the fault point). Then equivalent 
Thevenin circuit yields as 5.b and Thevenin impedance as mentioned. Therefore fault 
current can be calculated by formula 3.9: 
If,3ph =
Uth
√3.Zth
  (3.9) 
By substituting Uthand Zthin equation 3.9 fault current would be. 
If,3ph =
Uth.(Zs+l.ZL+Zg)
√3[(ZL.Zg+Zs.Zg+Zs.ZL)+l.ZL(ZL−Zs)−l2ZL
2]
  (3.10) 
Considering the fact that the nominator increases, both by the impedances and 
voltage profile improvement, fault current level increases as it shown in table 3.2 
resulted by simulated cases.  
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Figure 3.5 DGs Integration in Feeder 
Considering the source’s current contribution based on observing impedances 
through the fault, UG share in equation 3.10 can be calculated as: 
If,grid =
Zg
(Zs+l.ZL+Zg)
. If,3ph   (3.11) 
𝐼𝑓,𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑑 =
𝑈𝑡ℎ.𝑍𝑔
√3[(𝑍𝐿.𝑍𝑔+𝑍𝑠.𝑍𝑔+𝑍𝑠.𝑍𝐿)+𝑙.𝑍𝐿(𝑍𝐿−𝑍𝑠)−𝑙2𝑍𝐿
2]
   (3.12) 
Simulation results carried out for varied faults at different buses to obtain a more 
reliable assessment and confirming the above discussion. Table 3.3 shows fault current 
levels for different faults at some chosen buses. It is clear that DGs integration into the 
system increased fault current levels with different scales based on fault location. For 
example in bus 5, which is located quite near to the utility grid, we have 3.37 p.u 
increases in comparison with base case which is not acceptable without protection 
system regulation. Also in a load bus, i.e. bus 12, fault current increased by 0.11 p.u 
which equals to 152.7 in amps. It has been mentioned in the mathematical proof that as 
far as we are getting from the UG and DGs point of connection, when 𝑙 is approaching 
to unity, the amount of increase in fault current rate is more significant. It can be 
deduced from formula 3.10 which increasing the 𝑙  decreases the denominator as a 
result of the square factor with negative sign. 
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Figure 3.7 UG’s Contribution in 3-ph Bolted Fault at Bus 12 
3.2.4 Fault Current Contribution 
By adding DGs to the system, utility grids do not see the same impedance during 
fault as they used to. Therefore, their contribution into the fault current may change by 
DG locations and capacity. As it is clear in equation 3.12, the amount in change in UG 
share relies on DGs impact on voltage profile, DGs impedance, and more importantly 
their location regarding fault and UG location. Figure 3.7 and 3.8 illustrate UG 
contribution in a solid 3-phase to ground fault, which occurred respectively at bus 12 
and 11. It is clear from the plot that utility share of fault current decreased with DG 
existence in network as we expected. One can deduce from the Figure 3.7 which UG 
fault current share reduced by 0.8 p.u after adding DG to the system. Also there is a 
0.716 p.u reduction in UG fault current share with DG existence which is roughly 
24%, as shown in Figure 3.7. This is a critical alteration regarding protection system 
regulation, particularly if DGs would be decisive to connect to the network and 
generate power. This ideal network with private DG owners who decide when to 
connect their generators to the network demands more than a simple protection system 
regulation, i.e. smart and adaptive protection. On the other it should be mentioned that 
DGs types have significant impacts on UG fault share change. In fact, DGs with power 
electronics interconnections usually do not really affect the fault share and UG 
contribution as a matter of their own protective policies. Some wind turbines, micro 
turbines, and rotatory small synchronous DGs have a more significant impact on fault 
share traits. 
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Figure 3.8 UG Contribution in 3-ph Bolted Fault at Bus 11 
3.3 Impacts on Protection System 
3.3.1 IEEE 34-Bus and Protection System 
Central Protection Unit (CPU) manipulates digital relays adaptively by changing 
the system structure and DGs matrix. This section has been dedicated for the goal of 
investigating various effects that DGs integration imposes on a protection system that 
is already designed and operational, particularly for over-current protection. DGs 
integration into current networks can be a critical and delicate process. Depending on 
DG size and penetration, location, type, network interconnection, and structure, it can 
bring a variety of negative aspects which should be considered in advance. A radial 
power distribution network is the most common and economical scheme for 
transferring power to both industrial and residential areas. Ease of design, construction 
and expansion for such networks accompanies with more demand for DGs integration. 
However, DGs employment alters the fundamentals which radial networks and their 
consisting equipment are based on. The major changes in these principles can be 
categorized as: 
 Power Flow
 Voltage Profile
 Admittance Matrix
 Fault Current Characteristics (level, share, and path)
The major protection scheme in radial networks is over current protection system 
for both primary and back up. Such protection systems can be desperately affected by 
new network conditions unless proper measures have been taken. The goal of this 
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study is to identify and quantify the impacts of DGs integration into a radial network’s 
protection scheme and subsequently the network’s reliability and security. IEEE’s 
distribution feeders subcommittee has published a set of radial distribution networks. 
Discussion and results in this section were carried out from comprehensive MATLAB 
simulation on IEEE 34-bus benchmark incorporated with two types of DGs. The over 
current protection system has been designed using a modeled OCR 50/51 relay which 
tried to be similar to its industrial counterparts, like SEL-551, though in simpler scale 
as it has been explained in section 2.3.  
The IEEE’s distribution feeders subcommittee has published several test cases 
which are available at [10] including IEEE 34-Bus. The main purpose of these test 
systems is to evaluate the distribution power network’s software performance and 
accuracy [9, 10].  The IEEE 34-Bus test case which has been chosen in this study is not 
the largest test case in this category, though it does consist of a good variety of 
components and elements. However, it also can cause convergence issues originating 
from its length and unbalanced loads and currents. There are also some compatibility 
problems for simulating some of its components in software such MATLAB. The 
original test case consists of two three-phase and five single- and double-phase lateral 
feeding spots and distributed loads. There are two On-Load Tap Changer Transformer 
(OLTC) or voltage regulators and also two three phase voltage transformers at buses 
800 and 888. Although OLTC with individual changing taps has been simulated by an 
author in MATLAB Simulink, it has been ignored in studied test cases in order to 
magnify the effect of DGs integration voltage profile improvement on a protection 
system’s critical areas. Regardless, using designed OLTC severely slows down the 
simulation processing time, which for such a sophisticated system would be a 
significant amount of time. 
Figure 3.9 shows the modified IEEE 34-Bus test case with DGs integrated into it. 
The bus names provide both for IEEE test nodes and conventional labeling (separated 
by /) for radial distributed feeders based on layers. In this bus labeling, which is called 
branch numbering, the buses which are located in the same circular bus layer far from 
the utility grid are named first and next layer will be labeled as such in next steps The 
variety of loads which have been used in the original case are not available in 
SimPowerSystem simulation tool while has been simulated for reach the most 
accuracy in results. That is constant current and power (I, PQ) loads besides constant 
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Figure 3.9 IEEE 34-Bus Distribution Network Test Feeder 
impedance loads have been simulated. Distributed and spot loads with both D and Y 
connections have been simulated in this model. All distributed loads are assumed to be 
located at the end of their related feeders’ lines since this does not affect our results. 
Constant current and PQ loads have been modeled using the static load model which 
represents the relationship between power and voltage as an exponential usually 
expressed in following equations: 
P = P0 (
V
V0
)
np
 (3.13) 
Q = Q0 (
V
V0
)
nq
 (3.14) 
In which np is the active power exponent and nq is the reactive power exponent. P0 
and Q0 are the operating points of the loads and V0 is the bus minimum voltage. By 
setting the exponents to 0 and 1 the load would represent a constant power PQ and a 
constant current load respectively. 
Also, as shown in Figure 3.9, the network includes two 300 and 450 KVar shunt 
capacitance as reactive power compensation respectively at buses 844 and 848. These 
two capacitor banks are preserved in all three test cases with or without DGs. The UG 
transformer is a 2.5 MVA 69/24.9 kV step down and the other one is a 500 KVA 
24.9/4.16 kV. 
The IEEE test case does not include the over current protection scheme which has 
been discussed in the following section. The result which has been obtained from the 
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simulated case shows a good agreement in the case of voltage profile, power flow, and 
total active and reactive power consumption with respect to the ignored OLTCs. Three 
scenarios have been considered to investigate the current section. The first case is the 
IEEE simulated base case while two other cases are networks incorporating two DGs 
with high penetration in their branches. The second scenario uses two 1 MVA 
synchronous generators with 0.82 P.F and the third scenario contains two 480V DFIG 
wind turbines with 1 MVA capacity. DGs buses have been chosen based on the 
discussions presented in [10] and all DGs are connected to the network using a step-up 
transformer beside their own interconnection. 
Considering the critical case for evaluating DGs’ effects on protection systems, just 
two DG types are designated with the highest penetration and the two most 
controversial interconnections. Synchronous generator fault current and contribution 
depends on pre-fault voltage, sub-transient and transient of the machine, while it 
generally has a good contribution through fault current up to 500-1000% of nominal 
current at least for first few cycles [10, 11]. DGs interconnection fault play a 
significant role in their fault condition responses whether or not DG has a rotary torque 
and electromagnetic field is the first provision.  Inverter manufacturers protect their 
power converters by setting maximum currents and specific time for transient and fault 
conditions. The current limits can vary within 1.2 to 2.0 per unit of nominal current 
[11]. 
Spreading the generators throughout a radial network and attempting to produce the 
power on consumption sites decreases the transmission power loss. Hence, as it has 
been discussed in section 3.2.2 and can be deduced from the Figure 3.10 voltage 
profile does not obey the conventional reducing manner in base cases (without any DG 
integrated). It is clear from Figure 3.10 that the voltage profile is drastically increased 
by adding Synchronous DGs, especially in buses far from utility grid. DFIG DGs also 
exhibit the same results. Another important point here is the excessive voltage profile 
in some buses after integrating synchronous DGs. As mentioned above, synchronous 
DGs have been regulated in this simulation to cooperate in reactive power production, 
hence their impacts in voltage profiles are more significant. However, this 
demonstrates the concern that an excessive voltage profile may happen, particularly in 
buses with lightly loaded DGs after integration. 
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Figure 3.10 Voltage Profile for: a) Base Case b) Sync DG c) DFIG 
DG
After approving results yielded in the voltage profile section (3.2.2) in the above 
plot, we can also re-check the trend accuracy of results which have been presented in 
the fault current level section (3.2.3). Therefore various fault scenarios have been 
tested to compare the different fault current levels in three different cases with 
different DGs. Table 3.4 presents a summary of the fault current levels yielded by 3-
ph, LLG, bolted LG, and high impedance LG. One can deduce that adding 
synchronous DGs roughly doubles the 3-phase fault currents, while DFIG increases it 
drastically. As the fault current reduces by going down the table the DGs’ effect 
decreases.  For instance Sync DGs increased single line to ground fault (with 200 
ohms fault resistance) current by 0.47 p.u at bus 18 and by 0.39 with the DFIG 
integration case.  
Although all types of DGs improve the voltage profile and, as generally stated 
before,  increase the fault in current level is hard to be stated as general as the voltage 
profile. A precise categorization is needed to reach the point of formulating the effect 
of all DGs on the protection system and to be able to build an adaptive protection 
scheme to provide secure feeders with active branches. Some DGs, such as 
synchronous generators or micro turbines, usually do not use power electronic base 
power converters to synchronize with the network. This is why DGs depend on the 
impedance they see during the fault may contribute to the fault current even ten times 
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Table 3.4 Fault Current Level 
Fault Type Bus 
Base Case 
(no DG) 
Sync DG DFIG DG 
3-Phase 
10 9.19 13.74 11.46 
26 6.37 10.96 8.07 
30 6.18 10.52 7.88 
LLG 
9 9.22 13.08 11.07 
18 5.86 10.30 8.20 
25 5.39 9.70 7.69 
LG(B) 
9 7.78 9.81 8.99 
18 4.81 6.92 6.12 
25 4.49 6.48 5.71 
LG(Z ) 
9 1.7 1.97 1.86 
18 1.43 1.84 1.71 
25 1.41 1.81 1.66 
Figure 3.11 Utility Grid Contribution in Fault at Bus 32 
more than their nominal current. While the other DG types such as DFIG, PV, FC and 
so on have to use a converter to connect to the power networks. This DGs 
interconnection, which mostly consists of a back-to-back power converter, regulates 
the DG output voltage, frequency, and power. Manufacturers put limits on these 
interconnection packages to switch off in case of current exceeds nominal. This 
current can vary from 1.2 to 2.0 per unit while those inverters can feed a fault current 
transient at most 4 times their nominal current for less than a cycle. DFIG DG has 
been used in a current study and has the maximum current limit of 40 % more than its 
nominal current. 
Figure 3.11 illustrates the 0.5 per unit decrease in UG fault current contribution. 
The green curve is related to the case with DFIG DGs integrated and the red curve 
depicts the most decrease in the current share presents the case with synchronous DGs 
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integrated in network. One can understand that by decreasing the fault current share 
injecting from the utility grid during fault, all the relays sensing on the UG principal 
branch should be reconfigured. Almost always, the UG branch is the main and longest 
feeder with a big number of relays installed on it. This change obliged us to regulate 
all the relay settings to be compatible with the new power system situation which can 
be done remotely using CPU.  
Figure 3.11 and 3.12 present the responses for a bolted 3 phase to ground fault 
happening at bus 27. The fault current increase is significant in the plots. Figure 3.11 
depicts the system response without any integrated DGs. This is that the fault current 
is roughly 8 per unit which is almost half of the fault current magnitude in the case 
with integrated DGs which has been shown in 3.12. It should be mentioned that these 
fault scenarios have been tripped and cleared by the relay’s command. This is the 
reason that the case with no DG has been cleared after t=0.45 and the case with 
integrated DGs cleared on 0.412 second. 
As mentioned before, test cases in this study did not originally include an over 
current protection system. This is why a robust coordinated protection system using 
OCR 51 has been designed for them using the simulated relay. The relay design 
procedure and its details have been covered in section 2.3.1. The critical challenge in 
Figure 3.12 Utility Grid Contribution after DG Integration 
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Figure 3.13 Over Current Relays Allocations Inside Protective Zones 
the OCR protection system design is to maintain the relay’s coordination and system’s 
selectivity. Figure 3.13 shows that 12 normal inversed (IDMT) OCR have been 
employed to sketch the protection scheme. Using OCR 51 without dividing the 
network into protective zones lead us toward the same problem mentioned in using 
DT OCRs, that is, high trip time in upstream feeders. The protection system policy in 
4 designated zones is that each zone has its own primary and backup protection. 
Hence the zones are not responsible to support each other while their inter-area 
backup policy should maintain the minimum Coordination Time Interval (CTI=0.2 s). 
CTI is the least time gap between OCRs Time Current Characteristics (TTC) curves 
which ensures that the backup relay doesn’t trigger because of circuit breaker, 
switches, CTs, or other mechanical part delays or malfunctions. Because of the 
unbalanced nature of the case the OCR protection system design has been done 
separately for all three phases. 
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Figure 3.15 OCR Coordination Curves for Zones I to II 
Figure 3.14 OCR Protection System and Its Detailed Zones and Buses 
3.3.2 Feeders Nominal Current 
The IEEE 34-bus dominant feature consists of a vast variety of electrical elements such as 
real distribution feeders. This feature eases the way towards the discovery of more 
inconspicuous impacts of DGs integration where one may find more in a practical study. 
Distribution feeder equipment such over current relays, circuit breakers, surge arresters, and 
bus sectionizers have been designed to work under a nominal current. While these mediums 
can also tolerate a certain amount of picks and disturbances within their defined electrical, 
thermal, and mechanical limits. In a competitive market atmosphere these limits have been 
tightening to actual work conditions for more profit.  
As mentioned before, an IEEE 34-bus includes loads which are considered constant 
impedance loads (Z). These loads, representing a constant Z, consume active and reactive 
power based on their terminal’s voltage. This means a change in bus nodes can make a 
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 Figure 3.16 OCR Miscoordination for Fault at Bus 27 
noticeable difference in the power consumption of these loads. As a matter of fact, DGs 
installation improves the bus’s voltage profile, which leads to an increase on constant Z loads, 
nominal currents, and subsequently results in a greater increase in fault transient picks or 
inrush currents. This impact can disable the circuit breakers and switches to terminate the 
current. This can also affect the wiring and transmission line efficiency since they all have 
been designed for the previous current level. For example, in this study a lateral feeder with 
bus number 24 which has a constant Z load has had a nominal current equal to 0.24 p.u. before 
DGs’ integration. However, after DGs employment this normal current increased by 8% which 
is noticeable. This phenomenon can be negligible in feeders with less constant Z loads. 
Considering feeders consist of large number of such loads, it will definitely interfere with the 
protection scheme’s normal work condition and with other equipment. This means a tightly 
designed and coordinated overcurrent protection can consider an overload or inrush current as 
a fault current and consequently command a false trip to the related circuit breaker. On the 
other hand, it can be possible that circuit breakers and switches fail to work properly or may 
result in producing a large amount of surges which lead to the incapability in arc extinguishing. 
3.3.3 OCR Miscoordination 
The art of designing a robust and coherent protection system is directly referred to 
as relays logic and coordination. Dividing a network into separate protective zones and 
managing inside zone policy and also zone interactions are the factors which play a 
significant role in the protection system’s effective response. Hence, miscoordination 
is the most famous and dangerous side effect of DGs integration with currently 
working networks. It is useful to mention that all the time information presented 
bellow provided by fault time reference. 
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Table 3.5 OCR Miscoordination for Fault at Bus 27 
Fault 
Base Case Sync DG DFIG DG 
Primary Backup Primary Backup Primary Backup 
B27 
3Ph 
R10: 
0.25 
R7:0.88 
R10: 
0.19 
R9:0.42 
R7:0.6 
R11: 
0.25 
R10: 
0.22 
R9:0.53 
R7:0.61 
R11: 
0.38 
Table 3.6 OCR Miscoordination for Fault at Bus 18 
Fault 
Base Case Sync DG DFIG DG 
Primary Backup Primary Backup Primary Backup 
B18 
LLG 
R6:0.77 R4:0.92 
R6:0.78 
R7:0.63 
R4:0.9 
R8:0.56 
R9:0.43 
R6:0.69 
R7:0.81 
R4:0.94 
R8:0.83 
R9:0.52 
Many simulations have been done resulting in relay miscoordination as a result of 
DGs integration. Table 3.5 shows the results for a 3phase bolted fault occurring at bus 
27. As shown in the table in base case OCR 51, relay 10 correctly diagnosed the fault
condition and responded to it by determining a 0.25 second trip time after the fault 
happening time. Also, relay 7 supports the primary protection by considering a 0.88 
second period to trip after fault time. Considering the fact that these relays are located 
in different zones, the coordination time gap between them which is 0.63 second, is a 
proper secondary support tolerance time. However, in synchronous DGs case you can 
see that OCR 10 trip time is significantly decreased as a result of the change in fault 
current level. On the other hand, although relay 9 and 7 show an appropriate time for 
backup protection, relay 11 trips with almost every primary relay. This is a result of the 
change in fault current share and direction in different branches since relay 11 is not 
supposed to sense a generator fault current in its feeder. The same condition is 
resulting from DFIG in cases with less magnitude in time deviations in comparison 
with Sync cases. 
Table 3.6 also illustrates another significant case lead into major incoordination 
among protection relays. A line to line to ground fault happened at bus 18 which led to 
a 0.77 second trip time and R4 backup with a 0.92 second trip time in the base case. 
One can see that Sync cases R6 and R7 perfectly play the primary protection rule while 
the backup protection relays interfere with their task. One can see that relays 8 and 9 
tripped sooner than the primary protection relays. 
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Table 3.7 Overcurrent Protection Response 
Fault 
Base Case Sync DG DFIG DG 
Primary Backup Primary Backup Primary Backup 
B28 
LLZ 
R9:1.02 R7:1.68 
R9:5.78 
R11:0.31 
None 
R9:7.31 
R11:043 
None 
3.3.4 OCR Blinding 
The first step for a protection system to ensure system security is the capability of 
fault recognition. Overcurrent protection systems do this by comparing the measured 
current with a set pick up current. This is a straightforward approach, particularly when 
the normal current and fault current would have a constant, and also when they always 
have the same direction in radial networks. While this case, which stands for base case 
without any DG, does not hold for DG integrated cases. Consequently, adding DGs 
can change the current path in both normal and faulty conditions. This incident results 
in a protection scheme unable to detect a fault, particularly protection blindness or 
faults happening with connecting impedance. Also this integration changes the current 
phase in different buses which can be investigated using Phasor Measurement Units 
(PMU) in separate study.  
Relays measured current and calculations demonstrates that after Sync DGs’ 
integration, active power is provided by utility grid up to bus 16. This is a change in 
current and power paths in all downstream feeders under bus 16. The same results are 
carried out for active power using DFIG DGs, since they are the same, in active power 
production. Table 3.7 illustrates the protection system response to a LLZ fault which 
happened at bus 28 with 200 ohms fault impedance. It can be deduced from the table, 
primary overcurrent relay in which R9 correctly detects the fault current and 
considered a 0.73 second trip time after the fault happened. Backup relay R7 is in the 
back zone which has TT=1.38 seconds to support R9 with a good time coordination 
regarding the fact that they are located in separate zone. However, in sync DG cases, as 
a result of large amount of current injected by DG2, R9 does not see as much current 
as it has been measuring in the base case. Therefore, relay 9 shows a 3.78 second time 
interval after the fault happened, which is a desperately long time for such a fault with 
almost 5 fault current per unit. On the other hand, besides R11 which plays a primary 
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Table 3.8 Overcurrent Protection Response 
Fault 
Base Case Sync DG DFIG DG 
Primary Backup Primary Backup Primary Backup 
B20 
LLZ 
R8:12.1 R7:36.6 None None None None 
 Figure 3.17 Fault Current for Fault at Bus  
relay because of DG2 injected current, none of the other relays detected the fault 
current to back up the R9 operation.   
Protection system blindness because of DG integration is more likely due to the 
highly loaded distribution networks with a long feeder connecting them to the 
upstream substation. This means the utility grid is facing large impedance reaching the 
fault point leads to less contribution after DGs integration. On the other hand, such a 
network demands numerous DG units to enhance the voltage profile and provide 
power, which directs to more current path cross sections, detours for fault current 
which disables the former protection system to detect the fault condition. 
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Chapter Four 
Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) And K-means clustering 
4.1 Overview 
A synchronized measurement device is quite necessary for smart power system 
protection. Most researchers uniformly agree about applying the Phasor Measurement 
Unit (PMU) to estimate the system state and accurately measure the buses’ signals. 
This section investigates different algorithms to estimate phasor information by Phasor 
Measurement Units (PMU). Power Systems are getting more complicated and 
subsequently their supervision, control, and protection are more critical. Various 
systems such as Wide-Area Measurement Systems (WAMS) or Central Protection 
Unit (CPU) should be employed for this goal. All of these supervisory systems rely on 
PMU technology synchronized by a Global Positioning System (GPS). Therefore, 
PMU accuracy and performance during different power system working conditions has 
a severe impact on the system state estimation. The PMUs ability in accurately 
tracking desired phasor data is an important feature, particularly during disturbances. 
This has a critical impact on the supervisory system in maintaining system reliability 
and security as well as performing precautionary measures by CPU to prevent 
aggravating scenarios. It has been rigorously shown that Discrete Fourier based 
algorithms are the best methods in the digital world to implement in PMU devices for 
extracting phasor. Off-nominal frequency and performance during different working 
conditions have been studied in this section. Although other PMU algorithms have 
been explained in the summary, robust simulation has been performed in MATLAB 
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Simulink to compare DFT and SDFT as two of the main algorithms which have been 
considered for this study. On the other hand, methods have been discussed in this 
section to analyze the very large amount of PMU data. K-means clustering, 
specifically, is provided along with an initialization algorithm. The proposed 
algorithm, which has been explained, increases the K-means’ efficiency and accuracy 
and improves its redundant results with less computational burden. The importance of 
this proposed algorithm has been thoroughly discussed along with comparisons of the 
actual simulated PMU data in a simplified power system. 
4.2 PMU Algorithms 
One of the major concerns in current large interconnected power systems is 
maintaining system stability and security. This goal is more critical when power 
systems are working close to their boundary limits or are expected to work in a 
sophisticated situation with various DGs integrated in the system. On the other hand, 
terms such as smart grid are aimed at integrating decisive DGs into the network with 
adaptive protection, diagnosis, and prevent aggravating disturbances to avoid 
outrageous blackouts while also reaching goals such as smart and intelligent islanding. 
Supervisory and state estimation structures such WAMS and CPU has been innovated 
to make the real smart grid more feasible in power systems. However, all state of the 
art innovations in grid supervision and secure control rely on PMUs technology for its 
information.  
PMUs and digital relays are currently the back bones of power system supervision 
and protection methods. A device which measures the voltage and current signals’ 
phasors in a particular bus with a consistent stream of synchronized data is called a 
Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU). IEEE Std. C37.118 and IEC 61850 determine the 
Relays’ and PMUs’ required accuracy and standards [12-15]. PMUs’ accuracy plays a 
critical role in any state estimation or supervisory algorithm. This means PMUs’ 
errors, which clearly increase during faults or disturbances, may misdirect systems 
such as CPU and influence its stated performance.  
Many algorithms have been developed for PMU calculations. Martin Morf and 
Thomas Kailath developed the Least-Square Root method in their article in 1975 [13]. 
Large amounts of numerical calculations and matrix manipulations, needed for matrix 
inverse calculations and possibility for singular matrix, are the method’s drawbacks. 
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On the other hand, this method has issues because of huge numerical calculation 
burden as it is been explained in Lang and Laakso’s article in 1994 [14]. Lobos and 
Rezmer showed in their paper that the Prony method is significantly better than the 
DFT method, especially when using more than 20-length array [15]. However, it is 
also mentioned that prony demands complicated pre-filtering and window function to 
reach such a performance since it is very vulnerable to signal noises [16]. However, 
methods using signal’s Fourier series such as the Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) 
and the Smart DFT are more well-known and popular. Although these methods also 
need suitable filtering, but using signals Fourier coefficients and their simplicity 
enabled them to be used for current digital devices with minimal computational 
burden. Hence this section focuses on DFT and SDFT comparison to investigate their 
performances in extracting signal phasor data, particularly for signals which are 
representing actual power signals during fault and disturbances such as change in 
frequency, phase, and other off-nominal working conditions. 
4.3 Mathematical Principles of DFT and SDFT 
This section presents the algorithm of DFT and SDFT that estimates a signal phasor 
data [16, 17]. The measured electrical signal for purposes of phasor calculations can be 
considered as a sinusoidal (probably corrupted by additional harmonics, noises, 
additional filtering gain and delays) of frequency ω0=2π f as follows: 
𝑥(𝑡) =  𝑋 cos(∅(𝑡)) = 𝑋 cos(ω0𝑡 + 𝜑)               (4.1) 
ω0=2π f                    (4.2) 
Where X: Signal amplitude of the Voltage/Current signal 
f : is the signal frequency (60 Hz) 
𝜑: the phase angle of the Voltage/Current signal 
The signal x(t) can be conventionally represented as its phasor or complex form as: 
?̅? = 𝑋 𝑒𝑗𝜑 = 𝑋 cos𝜑 + 𝑗𝑋 sin𝜑                (4.3) 
Therefore x(t) can be expressed as: 
𝑥(𝑡) =
?̅?𝑒𝑗𝜔𝑡+?̅?∗𝑒−𝑗𝜔𝑡
2
                             (4.4) 
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Where * denotes the complex conjugation. Sampling is quite necessary for Discrete 
Fourier Transform execution and it is also inevitable for the real PMUs application in 
digital systems using ADCs. As mentioned in a variety of literature, sampling 
frequency does not affect the result accuracy as long as it meets the Nyquistrate [17]. 
Hence N, which is the number of samples per cycle, can vary significantly. Sampled 
signal in equation. 4.1 can be shown as follows: 
𝑥(𝑘) =  𝑋 cos(𝜔
𝑘
60 𝑁
+ 𝜑)                     (4.5) 
By calculating the x(t) signal DFT series, the fundamental frequency component will 
be: 
?̂?𝑟 =
?̅?
𝑁
∑ 𝑥(𝑘 + 𝑟)𝑒−𝑗
2𝜋𝑘
𝑁𝑁−1𝑘=0                               (4.6) 
Using equations 4.3 and 4.4 and considering fundamental frequency deviation: 
?̂?𝑟 =
?̅?
𝑁
∑ 𝑒𝑗2𝜋(60+∆𝑓)
𝑘+1
60𝑁. 𝑒−𝑗
2𝜋𝑘
𝑁𝑁−1𝑘=0 + 
?̅?∗
𝑁
∑ 𝑒−𝑗2𝜋(60+∆𝑓)
𝑘+1
60𝑁. 𝑒−𝑗
2𝜋𝑘
𝑁𝑁−1𝑘=0             (4.7) 
Rearranging the equation results in: 
?̂?𝑟 =
?̅?
𝑁
𝑒𝑗
2𝜋
𝑁
(1+
∆𝑓
60
)𝑟 ∑ 𝑒𝑗2𝜋
∆𝑓
60𝑁
𝑘𝑁−1
𝑘=0 + 
?̅?∗
𝑁
𝑒−𝑗
2𝜋
𝑁
(1+
∆𝑓
60
)𝑟 ∑ 𝑒−𝑗2𝜋
(2+
∆𝑓
60
𝑁
𝑘𝑁−1
𝑘=0             (4.8) 
Using the following identity: 
∑ (𝑒𝑗𝜃)𝑖 =
sin
𝑁𝜃
2
sin
𝜃
2
𝑁−1
𝑖=0 𝑒
𝑗(𝑁−1)
𝜃
2                             (4.9) 
Equation 4.8 can be expressed as 4.10, 
?̂?𝑟 =
?̅?
𝑁
𝑒𝑗
2𝜋
𝑁
(1+
∆𝑓
60
)𝑟 sin
𝑁𝜃1
2
sin
𝜃1
2
𝑒𝑗(𝑁−1)
𝜃1
2 + 
?̅?∗
𝑁
𝑒−𝑗
2𝜋
𝑁
(1+
∆𝑓
60
)𝑟 sin
𝑁𝜃2
2
sin
𝜃2
2
𝑒𝑗(𝑁−1)
𝜃2
2           (4.10) 
Where 𝜃1 =
2𝜋∆𝑓
60𝑁
and 𝜃2 = −
2𝜋(2+
∆𝑓
60
)
𝑁
 . 
By rearranging equation 4.10 we reach to the objective equation: 
?̂?𝑟 =
?̅?
𝑁
sin
𝑁𝜃1
2
sin
𝜃1
2
𝑒𝑗
𝜋
60𝑁
(∆𝑓(2𝑟+𝑁−1)+120𝑟) + 
?̅?∗
𝑁
sin
𝑁𝜃2
2
sin
𝜃2
2
𝑒−𝑗
𝜋
60𝑁
(∆𝑓(2𝑟+𝑁−1)+120(𝑟+𝑁−1))
  (4.11) 
Therefore we can define Ar and Br as: 
𝐴𝑟 =
?̅?
𝑁
sin
𝑁𝜃1
2
sin
𝜃1
2
𝑒𝑗
𝜋
60𝑁
(∆𝑓(2𝑟+𝑁−1)+120𝑟)
                          (4.12) 
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𝐵𝑟 =
?̅?∗
𝑁
sin
𝑁𝜃2
2
sin
𝜃2
2
𝑒−𝑗
𝜋
60𝑁
(∆𝑓(2𝑟+𝑁−1)+120(𝑟+𝑁−1))
                         (4.13) 
Therefore the equation 4.11 can be written as: 
𝑥𝑟 = 𝐴𝑟 + 𝐵𝑟                             (4.14) 
DFT and SDFT algorithms are completely the same until this point. Actually this 
similarity, which originates from Fourier application, enables both of them to take 
advantage of recursive computations [18]. Conventional DFT method assumes that the 
second term of frequency deviation in eq. 4.14 (𝐵𝑟) is small enough to be omitted. 
Hence, using 𝐴𝑟results in calculating the signal amplitude, phase, and frequency. In the 
simulated block used for following presented discussions, the calculated phase 
derivative has been used to correct the frequency deviation errors based on the 
equation: 
𝑓 =  𝑓0 + ∆𝑓 = 𝑓0 +
1
2𝜋
𝑑𝜑
𝑑𝑡
                           (4.15) 
However in SDFT algorithm both terms Ar and Br will be considered to reach a 
precise phase and especially frequency estimation during deviations. The exact 
solution for SDFT demands parameter a definition which is expressed below: 
𝑎 = 𝑒𝑗(−
𝜋
60𝑁
(2∆𝑓+120))
                            (4.16) 
By multiplying eq. 4.14 with ‘a’ and considering eq. 4.11 we reach to following 
relations: 
𝐴𝑟+1 = 𝐴𝑟 × 𝑎                 (4.17) 
𝐵𝑟+1 = 𝐵𝑟 × 𝑎
−1                 (4.18) 
Then: 
?̂?𝑟+1 = 𝐴𝑟+1 + 𝐵𝑟+1 = 𝐴𝑟 × 𝑎 + 𝐵𝑟 × 𝑎
−1                         (4.19) 
?̂?𝑟+2 = 𝐴𝑟+2 + 𝐵𝑟+2 = 𝐴𝑟+1 × 𝑎 + 𝐵𝑟+1 × 𝑎
−1             (4.20) 
If we multiply ‘a’ to the both sides: 
?̂?𝑟+1 × 𝑎 = 𝐴𝑟 × 𝑎 + 𝐵𝑟                (4.19) 
?̂?𝑟+2 × 𝑎 = 𝐴𝑟+1 × 𝑎 + 𝐵𝑟+1                           (4.20) 
Subtracting 4.14 from 4.19 and 4.19 from 4.20 results in: 
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?̂?𝑟+1 × 𝑎 − ?̂?𝑟 = 𝐴𝑟(𝑎
2 − 1)                           (4.21) 
?̂?𝑟+2 × 𝑎 − ?̂?𝑟+1 = 𝐴𝑟+1(𝑎
2 − 1)               (4.22) 
Dividing the two equations: 
?̂?𝑟+2×𝑎−?̂?𝑟+1
?̂?𝑟+1×𝑎−?̂?𝑟
=
𝐴𝑟+1
𝐴𝑟
= 𝑎                (4.23) 
Rearranging the eq. 4.23 results in the key quadratic formula which results in 
calculating ‘a’ as follows: 
𝑎 =
(?̂?𝑟+?̂?𝑟+2)±√(?̂?𝑟+?̂?𝑟+2)2−4?̂?𝑟+1
2
2?̂?𝑟+1
               (4.24) 
𝑓 = 60 + ∆𝑓 = cos−1(𝑅𝑒(𝑎)) ×
60𝑁
2𝜋
                         (4.25) 
Therefore by using SDFT algorithm taking both frequency deviations terms we can 
extract the signal phasor information as shown below: 
𝐴𝑟 =
?̂?𝑟+1×𝑎−?̂?𝑟
𝑎2−1
                 (4.26) 
𝑋 = |𝐴𝑟| ×
𝑁×sin(
𝜋∆𝑓
60𝑁
)
sin(
𝜋∆𝑓
60
)
                            (4.27) 
𝜑 = 𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒(𝐴𝑟) −
𝜋
60𝑁
× (∆𝑓 × (𝑁 − 1))              (4.28) 
It should be mentioned that eq. 4.1 in the first step of presenting the DFT and SDFT 
just contains the signal fundamental first harmonic. However, by assuming the rest of 
the harmonics in  the first step, the higher order SDFT can be derived, which results in 
more accuracy and robustness in estimating signal frequency during disturbances and 
off-nominal frequency working conditions. Although this advantage is just related to 
SDFT and DFT is the just explained simple algorithm, even SDFT have some limits in 
employing signals harmonics [18]. Using signal higher order harmonics accompanies 
computational burdens and delays. Delay, computational burden, and deployed 
microprocessor ability to process the calculation play a significant role in convincing 
the vendors not to use signal higher order harmonic but implement digital filters. 
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4.4 DFT and SDFT Comparison 
Simulation results and plots are shown in this section along with the comparative 
discussion. Both DFT and SDFT algorithms have been narrowly modeled in 
MATLAB Simulink to enable us to test various signal conditions and investigate both 
approaches. As mentioned, the number of samples does not have any significant 
impact on the PMUs’ output accuracy or other response characteristics. If the sampling 
frequency would be 𝐹𝑠 = 𝑁𝑓  , it means that we have N samples per cycle and 
sampling period is𝑇 = 1 𝐹𝑠
⁄  . The sampling frequency and number of samples per 
cycle determine the window length [19]. As it mentioned in the previous sections, pre-
filtering is a quite necessary step in processing the signal against noises and other 
issues such as frequency deviation or DC off set. The signal waveform will be filtered 
by a smoothening window which can play an important role on the PMU’s output. 
Many researches have been discussing various complicated smoothing windows, in 
particular Hamming, Blackman, Taylor, and rectangular window. However, in this 
study we are using the rectangular window to have a fair comparison with minimum 
filtering compensation and collaboration in the PMU’s output generation [19]. 
However, it is clear that using a rectangular window comes with some disadvantages 
particularly for fundamental frequency deviated signals that result in fair assessment 
and comparison for the worst cases. Various scenarios with different signals have been 
considered to investigate the simulated blocks with a focus on frequency deviation as a 
vulnerable point for Fourier based PMUs. Constant off-nominal frequency working 
condition, step change in signal frequency, and ramp change in frequency are the 
scenarios which have been studied. The PMUs’ frequency estimation output and also 
Figure 4.2 DFT and SDFT in off-Nominal Frequency (51Hz) 
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Figure 4.3 DFT Amplitude Oscillation 
impacts on signal amplitude calculation have been covered.  
Fourier based algorithms performance for estimating signals’ waveform amplitude, 
phase, and frequency are controversial for off nominal frequency. Although frequency 
has many definitions, most of literatures are unified in calculating the frequency based 
on the signal angular phase speed [20]. Figure 4.2 illustrates the DFT and SDFT 
performance in measuring the signal frequency. Signal real frequency is 51 Hz while, 
as mentioned in section II, both DFT and SDFT have been expanded based on the 50 
Hz fundamental signal. Hence we are expecting some errors in the PMUs’ output. 
Taking formula 4.14 into account, DFT has a significant error comparing to SDFT as 
of ignoring the second term which partially observes the off-frequency deviation. 
Therefore the DFT result oscillates around the actual frequency value (51 Hz) with 
0.65 amplitude which results in 1.3%Total Vector Error (TVE). Although this error is 
relatively significant because, the simulated PMU is estimating a signal with a 
different fundamental frequency than what PMU is designed for. According to 
equation 4.15, SDFT considers the off-nominal frequency and measures it by including 
equation 4.14’s second term. That is why SDFT is able to accurately estimate the exact 
frequency of the waveform with constant off-nominal frequency.  As illustrated in 
Figure 4.2, SDFT conducts a zero error in estimating the waveform frequency with 
constant frequency deviation, regardless of the deviation magnitude. 
Figure 4.3 depicts the DFT results in calculating the waveform amplitude. It should 
be mentioned that a signal amplitude of 100 has been chosen in this study hence the 
 50 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 5Hz Step change Response: a)DFT b)SDFT 
estimation error is equal to the TVE and there is no need for the simple TVE 
calculation. As a result of the signal 51 Hz frequency, the Fourier series should not be 
truncated after the fundamental coefficients. This is not consistent with DFT 
algorithms, but it is consistent with SDFT. Therefore, as plotted in Figure 4.3, DFT 
experiences 0.1% error in calculating the waveform amplitude for 1 Hz deviation. 
Since power systems rarely experience more than 10 Hz transient frequency deviation, 
the DFT performance is acceptable, while SDFT is surely more preferable due to its 
compatibility with IEEE C37.118 estimation error standards. A step change in the 
signal frequency is also investigated for analyzing and comparing DFT and SDFT 
performances. In this scenario the signal will maintain a 50 Hz frequency equal to the 
defined fundamental and experience a step change in t=0.5 second with amount of 5 
Hz which is a reasonable and possible case for the power systems application. Figure 
4.4 a and b illustrate the DFT and SDFT performances, respectively, in estimating the 
signal frequency. Both DFT and SDFT show a good performance in tracing the 
frequency step change, considering the fact that the pre-filtering window is rectangular 
and also a simple second order filter have been used in the output which may not be 
optimized in case of response time. However DFT results in spikes with 0.4 Hz error 
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Figure 4.5 2 Hz Ramp Change in frequency a)DFT 
b)SDFT 
(0.7% TVE) and a steady error equal to 0.3 Hz (0.54% TVE). On the other hand SDFT 
shows a significantly more accurate estimation to the step change in the waveform’s 
signal. As one can notice in Figure 4.4.b, SDFT has a fast response to the step change 
and results in a 0.11 Hz frequency estimation error and 0.18 TVE at most. Generally 
the SDFT scale of frequency estimation error in the case of step response is effectively 
better than DFT. On the other hand, DFT presents a larger amplitude calculation error 
as a result of 5 Hz total frequency deviation in comparison with previous case. Since 
by deviating from the fundamental frequency the Fourier coefficients truncations gets 
more significant and amount of amplitude calculation error deteriorates in DFT. 
Another case which has been investigated for algorithms’ performance study is a 
ramp change in the signal frequency. In this case, the waveform maintains a 
fundamental frequency (50 Hz) until t=0.5, by which time the signal frequency starts to 
change. Signal frequency changes as a timely ramp with a slope equal to 4 Hz/second. 
As can be deduced from Figure 4.5, both algorithms have couples of cycles delay in 
showing the output which is due to their output filters. However the algorithm 
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Figure 4.6 DFT Amplitude with Ramp Change in Frequency 
 
compensates this and reaches the actual real frequency. As it mentioned in the previous 
case, one the most significant issues with DFT which is the aggravating error by 
deviating more from the fundamental frequency is more obvious here. Figure 4.5.a 
clearly illustrates the fact that DFT frequency estimation error is expanding by 
increasing the ramp change. This mean at first the error is ignorable while by raising 
the frequency harmonics coefficients turn into a significant amount accumulated into 
the second term.  
On the other hand, Figure 4.5.a depicts a good performance from SDFT algorithm 
with small errors less than 0.05 Hz. However DFT errors aggravate into 0.28 Hz from 
the signals real frequency. Figure 4.6 depicts the DFT output for the signal amplitude. 
One can see that the same trend is happening in calculating the waveform amplitude 
originating from the same reason as explained. It is shown in the Figure 4.6 in the 
magnified section that as much as the frequency deviates more, the amplitude tends to 
oscillate more with a lower average. Reducing average of the calculated amplitude also 
is a result of ignoring Fourier fundamental frequency harmonics. 
The present study investigated algorithms for extracting phasor information from 
the signal waveforms particularly DFT and SDFT. Both of these algorithms are more 
favorable and preferable comparing to the others proposed for PMU.  Various signal 
scenarios has been used to evaluate algorithms output for different cases. DFT has 
issues for waveforms with off-nominal frequency deviations. The DFT information 
error is deteriorating as the frequency deviation increases. However SDFT is showing 
a better performance in tracking and extracting accurate phasor information from the 
signals. SDFT yields accurate phasor information mostly regardless of the deviation 
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magnitude. On the other hand, using DFT algorithm both estimated frequency and 
amplitude error will aggravate by rise in signal actual frequency from the fundamental. 
But SDFT maintain a limited amount of error even by change in the processed signal. 
SDFT also has the capability to use higher harmonics in order to increase the 
estimation accuracy while large computational burden is an obstacle in expanding the 
algorithm order.  
4.5 K-means Clustering 
The K-means clustering is one of the most popular and influential algorithm in data 
categorization methods. K-means’ simple and straightforward formulation made it a 
widely acceptable method in many fields and applications. This simplicity comes at a 
price, such as user defined number of clusters, uniformly sized clusters, and different 
final clusters being sensitive to initial centroids. K-means’ sensitivity to initial 
centroids leads to different clusters per execution with different and relatively large 
iteration numbers. Different applications have their own initialization and 
improvement techniques for K-means relying on their particular data traits. Power 
systems have recently been involved with data mining and clustering due to the fast 
increase in PMU uses for supervisory, control, and protection goals in smart grids. 
Large amounts of data streaming by PMU demands simple method with minimum 
computational burden to meet delay tolerance for various working phases and 
expectations. This thesis presents an approach to significantly improving K-means 
clustering algorithm by pre-analyzing the data and finding best initial centroids. 
Extensive experiments have been made to verify the approach’s robustness in reducing 
the number of iterations and resulting in unique clusters in all executions. 
K-means clustering is one of the most popular methods in data clustering. It has 
been utilized in applications such data mining, knowledge discovery, data compression 
and vector quantization, pattern recognition and classification, medical imaging, and 
many other fields involving experimental, statistical, or just large amounts of 
information[20]. Its simple and straightforward formula with a quite low 
communicational burden makes it the best option for PMU data manipulation. 
However, it rarely has been used in electrical power systems’ application comparing to 
its capacity. PMUs’ fast data stream demands a simple and adaptive algorithm which is 
able to adapt to ongoing stream of information. The K-means clustering simplicity and 
low computational burden comes at a cost. This cost includes user defined number of 
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clusters, uniformly sized clusters, and being sensitive to initial centroids. Xiong 
mentioned the fact that K-means clustering tends to produce clusters with relatively 
uniform sizes even by distinct varied input data. Many studies have covered algorithms 
to estimate number of clusters [21]. Initial centroids in many applications are more 
than enough to be determined randomly through the data [21]. However in our data 
types, K-means’ various deviations based on different random initial centroids may 
play a critical role in the last decision. K-means’ final result clusters vary significantly 
from the randomly chosen centroids within the PMUs data. On the other hand, 
algorithm number of iterations can be big or very different per each session of 
execution resulting from a blind start point.  
4.6 K-means Clustering Principals  
K-means clustering’s simple and straight formula is one of the important 
advantages which made it very popular in many fields and areas. Clustering’s problem 
is the challenge of categorizing a set of data into different groups so that each group’s 
elements hold some similar identities. These identities can be color, weight, position, 
and even gradient of change, which made the algorithm applicable from satellite and 
medical image processing to electrical power systems.  
Given X = {X1, X2, … , Xn}as an input set of data which consists of n objects with 
ddimensions in space of Rd, and the parameter 1 < K < 𝑛, which is the number of 
clusters that input needs to be categorized in, K-means clustering should determine 
Kclusters, including their vectors. K-means does not have a limit on input objects’ 
number of dimensions. That is, each X can be represented as Xi = [xi,1, xi,2, … , xi,d], 
when d can be any positive integer. The clustering algorithm starts by considering K 
number of points within X to start the algorithm with cluster initial centroids which 
should be close to their own clusters center of mass by the end of algorithm. One of the 
disadvantages of K-means is that it is very sensitive to the initial centroids that have 
been chosen. This dependency relies on the data natural structure [22]-[26].  Therefore 
choosing random centroids is quite sufficient for some types of data, while it results in 
completely dissimilar outputs for PMUs types of information, as has shown in section 
IV. Considering (M1, … ,Mk)centroids for Mjclusters when 1 ≤ j ≤ k and measuring 
the squared Euclidean distances for  Xi enable us to find the nearest centroid to eachXi. 
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Therefore the Mj clusters are being constituted with points that are closer to their 
centroids, comparing their distances to others, that is: 
Xi ∈  Mj ↔ ‖Xi − Mj‖
2
≤ ‖Xi − Mp‖
2
              (4.29) 
For all 1 ≤ p ≤ k , p ≠ j and with1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ k 
‖Xi − Mj‖
2
= d2(Xi, Mj) = ∑ (xi,h − mi,h)
2d
h=1              (4.30) 
The formula 4.30 presents the squared Euclidian distance for d dimensional points. 
Some k-mean algorithms utilize different distant computations which don’t have a 
significant impact on the results in this particular application. However in some fields 
it may increase the chance to find the global minimum for the final error. As shown 
above, using 4.30 distant of each Xiwill be computed and Xiwill be put into cluster 
(Mj) which its centroid (Mj) is the most closest to Xi. Each cluster contains an error, 
which is the sum of all its points’ distance with its centroid. The goal of K-means is to 
minimize the clustering error and the overall error will be the sum of all the clusters 
error which is: 
E(l) = ∑ ∑ ‖X − Mj‖
2
X∈Mj
k
j=1                 (4.31) 
Formula above can be presented as bellow, l is the iteration number. 
E(l) = ∑ ∑ I(Xi, Mj)‖Xi − Mj‖
2k
j=1
n
i=1               (4.32) 
Il(Xi, Mj) = {
1     Xi ∈ Mj
0     Xi ∉ Mj
                (4.33) 
E(l)  is calculated in each iteration. Minimizing this function leads to the best 
clustering result. Hence either the amount of this function or its change in comparison 
to previous iterations can be used as the algorithm termination condition. However, the 
most common termination condition is the fact that no more points will be transferred 
within the clusters, meaning the K-means algorithm converged to a steady state and 
satisfied most of the applications. But E(l) termination conditions are more useful for 
cases with data which may not converge, large amounts of data, or data with 
significant amounts of noise or uncorrelated points. The condition to terminate the 
algorithm using the error function can be: 
E(l) − E(l − 1) ≤ ε                            (4.34) 
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K-means algorithm summary: 
 Input: 𝑿and 𝑘 as input data set and number of clusters 
 Random initial centroids: 𝑀𝑗 
 𝑙 = 1 (first iteration) 
 Calculate objects distances with centroids:‖𝑋𝑖 − 𝑀𝑗‖
2
 
 Compare the distances and update the clusters:𝑴𝑗  
 Terminate if no change in clusters’ members. 
 Update the centroids: 𝑀𝑗
𝑙+1 
 𝑙 = 𝑙 + 1, go to 4th line 
 
Both centroids and clusters’ group of objects will be updated in each of the 
iterations. Centroids play an important role in K-means number of iterations to 
converge, ensure the quality of, and stabilize the clustered results in different 
executions. With the exception of the first loop, in the rest of the iterations, centroids 
update based on the formula below to approximate the cluster j center of mass used for 
iteration l + 1. Updating the centroids mostly results in a better value for the Error 
function in the next iteration (l + 1) although divergence is possible, particularly for 
random initial centroids. Equation 4.35 calculates the mean of the objects which are 
already categorized in cluster j and nMjis the number of objects in Mj
l. 
Mj
l+1 =
1
nMj
∑ XjX∈Mj
l                            (4.35) 
4.6 Proposed Initialization Algorithm  
The K-means clustering requires the user to determine the number of clusters and 
initial centroids. Both these pieces of information are challenging and the details on the 
number of clusters are beyond this study. Figure 4.8 presents a typical PMU output 
data (phase a) which has been yielded from a power system scenario. This scenario has 
been explained in the next section, along with the test case which used for PMU data 
extraction. 
 Figure 4.7 K-means Basic Algorithm 
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Figure 4.9 Discrete Function D(i) Representing the System Step Length 
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As mentioned before, each category of data has its particular traits due to its natural 
system and field. Dashed lines in Figure 4.8 separate the different phases of working in 
our system as the scenario events are happening in 0 to 1 second simulation time 
spans. Plotted curves fall into 4 categories, three of which are C-1, C-2 and C-3 and are 
related to the system when it is stable. Narrow bands in Figure 4.8 followed by dashed 
lines represent the transient time in which the system encounters a change or fault and 
needs to pass a time to be dampened. Figure 4.8 comes from a stream set of data with 
24,031 points yielded by a PMU. It should be mentioned that as opposed to medical or 
other fields, order of data exists in PMU output and matters in this study. This is how 
each Xi ( 1 ≤ i ≤ 24031) relates to a specific moment and is a dot with its position in 
a system trace. Figure 4.10 presents the same data in a 3-D plotted environment using 
dots to curve the data. Cyan colored dots in Figure 4.9 are related to narrowly dashed 
Figure 4.8 PMU 5 Data for a Scenario 
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Figure 4.10 PMU 5 VIa 3-D Data Presentation 
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line times in Figure 4.8 and in the same manner exist for C’s and their colors. One can 
deduce that Figure 4.8 narrow bands in trivial times result in far spaces in actual 3-D 
space. That is, transient parts take a small amount of time but the plotted system using 
dots results in a bigger step length for dots for those time periods. This phenomenon is 
true for faults, change in load, DGs disconnection/connection, and any other 
disturbance or work condition alteration in power systems. PMUs samples the phasors 
in a constant sampling rate, synchronized by satellite GPS. Hence, any change in 
Figure 4.10’s dots’ step length is merely due to the system’s response, which can be 
categorized based on the change and average step change. For instance, in Figure 4.10 
the upstream utility grid feeds the system in C-1. Connecting a significant amount of 
DGs to the system changes the system working point, moving it from C-1 to C-2. After 
stabilizing in C-2, the system encounters a fault and enters into C-3. Moving the 
system’s working condition in Figure 3 from C-1 to C-2 is by close dots with small 
steps, however dots are running from C-2 to C-3 which indicates a fault. Also power 
system and PMU output data have a concentration of data points in a steady state 
condition. That is why we have more than 5,000 data points in each of C’s sections 
while all the cyan parts number less than 1,500.  
These two PMU data traits, data step length, and concentration have been 
considered to find the best initial centroids with the simplest procedure. A discrete 
function has been used to calculate every step length of the system. Function D(i) is 
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Figure 4.11 Proposed Initial Centroids Calculation Algorithm Flowchart 
shown here: 
D(i) = ‖Xi − Xi−1‖                      (8) 
When 1 < 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 and subsequently the length of D(i) is always one less than length 
of data set. Figure 4.9 illustrates the resulted function for Figure 4.9’s PMU data and 
undergone scenario. As you can see, the value of D(i) for the i’s which are located in 
the transient time periods are significantly more and sometimes abnormal compared to 
other times. Figure 4.9 and the magnified section clearly presents that during the 
steady state operation the data points’ step length barely exceed 0.2 with an average in 
the range of 0.05. But when the system changes its phase of working operation point, 
this step change significantly increases to more than 1.  
Using the function D and the PMUs data traits enabled us to develop the innovative 
and practical proposed algorithm for calculating the best initial centroids location. 
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Figure 4.11 shows the flowchart for the algorithm which has been proposed and 
utilized in MATLAB programming environment to determine the best initial centroids. 
After reading the user provided set of data X and the demanded number of clusters (k), 
function, D(i) is being calculated in the third executing stage. In the fourth section the 
mean value of the D function will be calculated and called md. md plays a significant 
rule in the algorithm result, efficiency, and adjustment. It can be seen that the single 
and main loop in the algorithm judges the data based on this value. As a matter of fact 
this algorithm can be used in other fields having the same traits which have been 
mentioned in previous paragraph by regulating the value of md and c to increase the 
accuracy and to avoid the loss of important data. Another task in this stage is the data 
analysis which evaluates the data dimension, scales, and important parameters such as 
data density and diversity in the space of Rd. All values of the D function will be 
evaluated in the algorithm loop section. Taking advantage of MATLAB programming 
by string coding enables us to have an undefined number of batches. Figure 4.10 and 
the dot’s step length has been used in the algorithm loop. That is in this loop each 
group of X’s which have a D value less than c×md, i.e. the points have a common and 
relatively small step length, fall into a batch. However for being conservative about 
this, the c coefficient will be chosen tightly to have a bigger number of batches but not 
to mixing X’s which may not belong to a same cluster. Increasing the i in the loop if 
the current D(i) didn’t meet the condition, a new batch will be created and next points 
will fall into this batch unless the loop meets the termination condition or a point step 
length (D) won’t meet the core condition again, resulting in another batch.  As 
mentioned in the last paragraph, c and md are the parameters which led us to regulate 
and adjust the algorithm either for PMUs and power system applications or for any 
other fields for which their data have the same traits as discussed. In this application 
the total number of data points is 24,031, therefore batches with sizes less than 100 can 
be easily considered as noise or at most unnecessary. It should be mentioned that we 
have reached the same results by ignoring batches sizes of 1,000 but 100 will be the 
most conservative batch reduction size. The algorithm merges the batches with close 
average points. This is not really critical in real systems, as we assume we will have 
enough data during normal working conditions and abnormal working conditions have 
smaller periods of time compared to the normal, steady state. Pushing the algorithm to 
the edges of this section has been done using the data scale analysis section which 
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Figure 4.12 PMU 5 Clustered by Basic K-means 
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Figure 4.13 PMU 5 Clustered Using Proposed Algorithm 
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gives the algorithm an idea about how far the clusters may exist, taking the data 
density into account.  After this stage, we have a limited number of batches each of 
which includes sets of data with certain distance of their average. These batches will be 
organized in a rising manner based on their sizes. Obviously, batches with larger sizes 
have more importance for us at least as far as indicating clusters with bigger sizes. 
Finally, the top k ones of these batches will be chosen to represent the clusters and 
their center of mass will be calculated. These centroids will be used for K-means initial 
centroids significantly improves it as it will be explained and shown in next section. 
4.7 PMU Data Clustering  
A simplified 8-bus system has been used in this study for simulations and PMUs’ 
raw data extraction. SDFT PMU has been used in to estimates the voltage, current, and 
phases of the installed bus with specific sampling frequency. The 8-bus system is a 
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radial which is fed from the upstream utility grid (UG) connection. In downstream 
feeder, it has a large amount of DG which connects at the scenario’s second period. 
The designed scenario aims to show how the system’s working state changes and how 
the PMU data and subsequently proposed algorithm responses change. Figure 4.8 can 
clearly present the scenario starting from t=0 with normal condition and just being fed 
from UG. At t=0.3, the downstream DGs connects to the network improving the 
voltage, reducing the sensed current, and significantly changing the phase in that 
specific bus. At t=0.6, a bolted 3-phase happened in the middle of the network which is 
noticeable through the PMU output and will be cleared at t=0.9. After fault clearance, 
the system is still being fed from both sides. This is the system that has the same state 
as the second period marked by C-2 sign in green. 
Figure 4.9 illustrates PMU 5 VIa data plotted based on the known scenario 
periods. Hence the transient parts are in cyan and the actual clusters have been 
categorized by different colors and arrows showing the cluster names which are the 
same in other PMU 5 cluster results. The cyan colored data is to clarify the borders and 
system states (on bus 5) presented in 3-D Rdfor the designed scenario. Figure 4.12 
presents the clustered data using the basic K-means algorithm and Figure 4.13 shows 
the resulting clusters using the proposed algorithm. One can observe in Figure 6 that 
the basic algorithm could not differentiate the C-1 cluster region and specified parts of 
the transients to it. However the actual C-1 has been included in the green cluster 
section as of C-2 which is not correct. On the other hand, Figure 4.13 clusters using the 
proposed algorithm have distinct borders and correct cluster regions compared to 
Figure 4.9. Using the basic algorithm took 8 iterations while taking advantage of the 
proposed initialization algorithm reduced it to 9 iterations. Decreasing the iterations by 
one third has a significant impact on the clustering computational burden on 
applications.    
It is worth mentioning that in power system applications, Central Protection Unit 
(CPU) may utilize different data combinations. Figure 4.8 illustrates 3 plots of data 
(VI) that can each be expanded to phases abc. The same thing is applicable using the 
signals’ sequences. Now any combination of this data can be used for decision making 
and clustering processes regardless of the number of dimensions. The proposed code 
has no limitation in data dimensions which enables the CPU to utilize any combination 
of preferred data.  
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Figure 4.14 PMU 3 Clustered by Basic K-means 
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Figure 4.15 PMU 3 Clustered Using Proposed Algorithm 
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Figure 4.14 and 4.15 present clustering results for the same scenario but use data 
from PMU3. Figure 4.15 depicts the clustering result from using the proposed 
algorithm for 3 scenario periods. Connecting the DG at t=0.3 resulted in the system 
state going from C-1 to C-2 and has a minor location change based on bus 3 signals. 
Hence, the installed PMU at bus 3 has been chosen, as C-1 and C-2 are located close to 
each other which is more challenging for clustering. Clustered data in Figure 4.15 
shows the correct distinction between C-1 and C-2 knots. However Figure 8 illustrates 
how K-means may result in a totally incorrect result as of random initial centroids. 
That is, both C-1 and C-2 knots have been classified inside a single cluster, the parts of 
which transient have been mistakenly considered as the third cluster. Using the basic 
K-means method yields results by 9 iterations while the proposed algorithm again 
decreases it by one third. Data pre-analyzing by proposed algorithm results in precise 
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Figure 4.16 Clustered Using Proposed Algorithm 
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and stable clustering in any number of executions. It has been mentioned before that 
K-means clustering uses the basic algorithm and does not have a stable output. That is, 
Figures 4.12 and 4.14 are two selections from many executions which have been made 
by the author. The basic code may even result in really accurate clustering output or 
aims to a totally surprising clustered data as of local minimums in objective functions. 
However the number of iterations never reaches less than two times the number of 
iterations using the proposed algorithm. Figure 4.16 presents a complicated scenario 
case which has been clustered using the proposed algorithm. In this complicated fault 
scenario we have four faults happening which have been added to the steady state 
working situation result in 5 clusters. These clusters have been represented as C1 to C5 
in the plot. Faults happen with 0.2 second intervals (the system is in a steady state 
condition C3 in this states) and each of them stays in the system for 0.2 second as well. 
This cluster result has been yielded by 6 iterations when same clusters’ region and 
iterations have been yielded in any execution. On the other hand, the basic algorithm 
has significantly different cluster regions per each execution with some critical 
mistakes in categorizing two cluster knots in a single cluster in many runs. Basic code 
takes a number of iterations with a minimum of 21 and a maximum of 48 observed and 
the iteration average total of 34 runs, which is really high compared to 6 iterations 
using the proposed algorithm. 
4.8 Conclusion 
In this section a new algorithm has been developed to pre-analyze the data and 
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calculate the initial centroids for clustering using K-means. K-means clustering has a 
significant importance in our proposed CPU as well as in many other applications. 
Each application’s data has its special traits. Basic K-means clustering simply uses 
randomly chosen data to start with as initial centroids. This results in unstable and 
inaccurate in clusters in big iteration numbers. The proposed algorithm takes 
advantage of the power system PMU data characteristics to evaluate the scales of the 
data and calculate the most efficient initial centroids. This approach significantly 
reduces the number of iterations and stabilizes the clustering output. That is, the 
clustering regions no longer vary in each execution. The effectiveness of this algorithm 
can be used in CPU for power system online protection applications. The algorithm is 
simple and does not add a significant computational burden to the system and can be 
considered for fast and transient applications.  
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Chapter Five 
Central Protection Unit (CPU) for Smart Grids with Decisive Private DGs 
5.1 Overview 
Current power systems are taking advantage of systems such as WAM and SCADA 
(supervisory control and data acquisition) for supervising networks in case of 
disturbances or oscillations. These supervisory systems are barely effective as they are 
unable to manipulate the system equipment and take action instantly. Actually SCADA 
can be described as a data acquisition, monitoring, and archiving center which 
technically facilitates one of the vital inputs for innovative CPU.   
On the other hand, the current power systems are heading towards integrating DGs 
as much as possible with private owners who are deciding about the generation time 
schedule. This means system structures and generation points are constantly changing 
and networks should be able to be flexible to the changes by adapting with the new 
structures. With any significant changes in downstream feeders or generation plants 
the amount of power transfer and direction alter. Subsequently, protective elements 
and relay characteristics need to be corrected. This task should be done by sending 
crews to various sites and substations nowadays. One of the CPU’s tasks is to remotely 
manipulate relays’ characteristic coefficients. Inventing digital relays such as Simens 
SIPROTEC family, SEL Relays, and GE’s D series relays manipulation is more 
affordable, there are still many other limitations. The more important issue is to reach 
the point of diagnosing the network state as discussed in previous chapters. 
With the integration of SERs into the power networks, islanding would be one of 
the choices to take advantage of DGs benefits. By islanding some regions within faults 
instead of disconnecting a large area, we would isolate the faulty line and the islanded 
region can keep on feeding loads while standing alone. In the invented CPU central 
logic, some definitions such as load priorities have been considered which have been 
explained. These all are feasible by taking advantage of various sections discussed in 
previous chapters which are DG impacts on Power Systems, Digital Relays, PMU 
algorithms, PMU data analyzing, K-means clustering and other mathematical 
approaches for mining PMU data such as higher order indices such as kurtosis and 
skewness. These are all parts of the CPU’s central decision making system, but they 
also need more sections to cooperate with each other and provide supportive 
information. This chapter describes the proposed algorithm and structure called CPU 
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Figure 5.1 Central Protection Unit (CPU) Overview 
and how it can be adapted to the current systems in order to build a smart protection 
unit for smart grids.  
5.2 CPU Description  
The picture bellow illustrates the general overview of CPU and its complementary 
systems. Details and technical complexities have been avoided in this figure to depict a 
prospective overview of the proposed CPU. Various systems are connected to each 
other through the CPU to provide it with needed information. Some of these systems, 
which have been covered in this study, are already being used and the CPU employ 
them with minor adjustments. This is one of the benefits of the proposed CPU, that it 
uses almost all the capacity and equipment already installed in power systems.  
5.2.1 Off Line Data 
Recent advances in science and technology have been fast, effective, and innovative 
which should be considered in any new design. Off line data sections in the CPU 
prototype play an important role regarding critical information needed for any decision 
making. This information consists of three parts: 
 Load Prediction and Power Flow 
 Generation Units Data 
 Power Systems Specification 
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Figure 5.2 Central Diagram 
 
Load prediction is absolutely vital for power flow calculation and the CPU. 
However, it can be calculated in a timely manner outside of the CPU task in order to 
reduce the processing time needed to reach a decision. It should be mentioned that 
facilities doing this process are currently available and operational in power systems. 
These just need to be adjusted with CPU and to be equipped by communicational 
means to send their output for CPU off line data storage centers.  
5.2.2 DGs Environmental Condition 
Natural disasters are one the causes for outages, especially for systems working on 
the boundaries resulting in blackouts. Scanning the earth via satellite for either 
forecasting or tracking the weather and environmental conditions is quite conventional 
at present. Having this data in the input, CPU has already run various scenarios which 
might happen. Therefore in cases of faults or disturbances the response can be 
broadcasted in less than a cycle all over the system and be imposed in less than 3 
cycles. The fault/disturbances can be either a disconnection of the DGs that are 
working in the severe weather condition or started by any ordinary faults in other 
places tending to deteriorate with some vulnerable units in the system. Another use for 
this information is that CPU can call out for 
standby DGs to be replaced by 
environmentally affected units in case of 
optional or obligatory disconnection to avoid 
power disruptions for even the slightest 
moments.  
5.2.3 Authority Load Priority  
This section is about the information 
provided by the government based on the 
country’s current situation. A country, region, 
or continent based on the environmental, 
economic, political or geographical situation 
can be critically more dependent on some 
particular load. Also a country might even be 
in favor of some special region or area 
electrical load because of being in the middle 
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of an ongoing strategic situation. This means the priority of that region’s loads is too 
high that the rest of the region's power reliability can be sacrificed. The amount of 
value and priority which is given to such an area and region can be defined by the 
governmental authority and attributed using weight indices. This can be considered in 
best islanding calculations and graph generation. This information consists of load 
priorities which should be considered in islanding calculation. This can be a critical 
industrial plant that’s disconnection will affect the country’s economy or even a 
military bases, which are required to be uninterruptedly fed. In this case, the CPU will 
not disconnect the high demanded load or at least considered it as a well fed, stand-
alone island.  
5.2.4 Online Data 
In the CPU prototype, Online Data refers to all the systems and infrastructure 
gathering raw information from power systems in current operation. These systems are 
SCADA, WAMS, DGs Coupling Point, and PMUs all over the network. SCADA 
gathers information from all network substations using Ethernet. The most important 
role of SCADA is being connected to all digital relays, SF6 circuit breakers, and RTU 
equipment to make it eligible as a perfect command career. This means in case of any 
change in DGs topology or islanding, it is SCADA which take the responsibility of 
imposing the changes by transmitting the command to devices. DGs coupling point 
online data stream plays as a check signal for CPU. CPU is significantly focused on 
being flexible to change in DGs topology, whether obligatory or not, i.e. as an optional 
decision by DG owners. This is why one of the important advantages of this system is 
being adaptive in case of decisive DG owners.  
Figure 5.2 depicts the flowchart which CPUs decision making uses along with 
information needed for its task. One can pay attention to where online data has been 
placed, which illustrates their importance in CPU processing center as well as three 
separate decision making methods. These accurate methods are: 
 Neural Networks 
 State Estimation 
 K-means Pattern Recognition 
PMU constant stream of data plays a major part of these decision making methods. 
Its accuracy during steady state and fault condition and its ability to track the aimed 
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Figure 5.3 K-means Clustering for a Fault Scenario 
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values during severe fault is highly improved by this invention. This is why a 
tremendous amount of time and care has been spent on discussing, designing and 
improving PMUs. This has resulted in the state of the art DFT and SDFT PMUs that 
have the ability to track the frequency and estimate the phase with fewer than 10-4 
errors during the faults and disturbances in an ideal design. This accuracy and ability in 
tracking the signals precisely enables us to implement mathematical methods such as 
State Estimation and K-means Clustering. For instance Figure 3 depicts PMU data 
processed and categorized by K-means clustering. Method strength is clear in 
categorizing PMU’s data for a scenario consisting of 4 faults in row. 
Figure 5.2 depicts the flowchart of the CPU main processing algorithm. One may 
notice that decisions made in CPU have been based on a parallel system investigation 
using three separate methods. In unanimous situations the decision security is not an 
issue. However there will be cases in which various combinations of decisions may 
result in separate methods. Based on various working conditions and accuracy limits, 
violation in Online Data stream a weighting index will be attributed to each of the 
results. Therefore, the final system state will come out as a matter of working condition 
and method robustness in various cases along with indices attributed to it.  
The main CPU processing and logic core 
determines the state of the system and whether 
or not there is an abnormal sign. Online data 
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Figure 5.5 System State Estimation Using Vφf Signals 
 
 
Figure 5.6 a) Kurtosis and b) Skewness Indexes 
 
 
continuously feeds into the CPU’s central processing logic to provide it with raw. 
When using three parallel disturbance diagnosis systems a fault or disturbance will be 
easily noticed. In the next stage, CPU will locate the fault point or region using PMUs 
data. It should be mentioned that different fault and disturbances would have various 
effective areas, speeds of impact and approaches to locate. For instance a single line to 
ground fault can be detected using PMUs abrupt change in phase, current, and voltage 
which engages a couple of buses and the faulty transmission line. While small, the 
signal instability initiated from a single bus or machine can involve a wide region. An 
interesting point in here is that using off line data and online load and generation 
acknowledgments, CPU can easily decide whether a system change resulted from a 
fault or not. This is because CPU already has an expectation of operating system based 
on online and off line data.  
Fault type will be detected by designing robust algorithms that are already watching 
the system state path. Also archived data has been used both to constantly train neural 
networks and also for updating pattern recognition algorithms. For instance, in Figure 
5.5 a preferred state estimation plot lead to using PMU data using Vφf signals. A 4 
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faults scenario with clear time durations has happened on the system where it is clear 
that the CPU easily diagnosed all the faults and phases. Taking advantage of Kurtosis 
and Skewness indices in order to analyze huge amount of data coming from PMUs and 
WAMS systems is another mathematical option. Therefore, these two statistical data 
analyzers have been employed as one of the parallel and independent fault and 
disturbances detectors. These indices have been shown in Figure 5.6 for the same fault 
scenario as Figure 5.5. 
5.3 Conclusion 
This thesis has covered power system’s various structures and their special 
characteristics in the initial sections. Various DG types and their characteristics during 
the normal condition and their responses in case of fault scenarios have been presented 
based on references and previous studies.  
It has been shown in chapter 3 how DGs integration alters the system voltage, 
normal and faulty current, power transfer in lines, and stability. It has shown that 
SDFT algorithm based PMU is the most suitable synchronized measurement device for 
CPU protective goals. K-means clustering showed the best performance and adaptivity 
in categorizing the PMU output data. K-means issue regards the number of clusters 
and random initial centroids have been solved by the data pre-analyzing SIC algorithm. 
Skewness and Kurtosis have been discussed and used as higher order indices for 
disturbance fast diagnosis. These indices have a higher speed and lower reliability. 
That is why the reliability weighting index has been introduced in last chapter to judge 
parallel diagnosis approaches with different outputs. Chapter 5 narrowly introduced the 
proposed CPU that facilitates smart protection for smart grids. 
5.4 Future work 
This research work investigates a major challenge in power systems. Some aspects 
of this research work are complimentary sections to the proposed CPU which can be 
chosen as future research topics in this field.  
 Investigating power market and CPU possible impacts  
 Communications rate and its obstacles in CPU especially for transient stability  
 Using graph theorems for evaluating the best DGs connecting matrix and 
islanding  
 Using high dimensional data in K-means clustering algorithms 
 Storage devices such PHEV and their impacts on the CPU 
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